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INTRODUCTION

The disjunction between constitutional text and presentday federal trial practice could not be more pronounced.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates that “[t]he
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury.”1 Yet in modern America not all federal criminal trials
are by jury. If Article III’s command were taken literally, all
federal criminal trials would involve juries and there would
be no bench trials for criminal offenses.2 Yet in recent years,
bench trials account for approximately 13.6% of federal felony
prosecutions that go to trial,3 and 58% of all federal criminal

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 48 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
2. This Article concerns only federal criminal trials in the civil justice
system. Except for the discussion in note 104 this Article does not consider
criminal-trial practice in the military and admiralty courts. See infra note 104.
Nor does it discuss non-jury trials in the now abolished system of consular
courts. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1957) (discussing trial by jury in
consular courts); id. at 86–87 (Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing the demise
of consular courts). The disjunction between constitutional text and trial
procedure in those courts will be the topic of a subsequent paper. This Article
also does not consider federal criminal prosecutions which are resolved by guilty
pleas. At present, approximately 85% of federal criminal convictions are
secured by guilty pleas.
See Table 4.2. Disposition of Criminal Cases
Terminated, by Offense During October 1, 2006 – September 30, 2007, BUREAU
JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2196 (last
updated Oct. 21, 2010). It is generally accepted that guilty pleas obviate the
need for a trial, and therefore, for a jury. See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65, 81–82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); West v. Gammon, 98 F. 426, 429
(6th Cir. 1899). In addition, guilty pleas were a recognized alternative to jury
trial at common law. The interpretive convention that constitutional terms may
be defined by the principles and practices of the English common law of 1789
supports permitting guilty pleas. See, e.g., Schick, 195 U.S. at 69 (saying “the
Constitution . . . must be read in light of the common law”); Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) (stating and applying the convention to Article III’s
jury trial provision); West, 98 F. at 428–29 (stating and applying the convention
to guilty pleas). But see WILLIAM ATWELL, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW PROCEDURE 26–27 (3d ed. 1922) (arguing that “permitting pleas of guilty to
be taken in felony cases” is unconstitutional); Laura I. Appleman, The Lost
Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 398, 440, 446 (2009)
(questioning the constitutionality of guilty pleas).
3. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 244 tbl.D-4
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trials.4 Some of these bench trials occur because defendants
have waived their right to a jury. 5 Others occur because
defendants are charged with what is regarded as a “petty”
offense and the Supreme Court has held that Article III’s jury
trial mandate applies only to crimes that are “serious.”6 For
petty offenses, the federal government is free to allow or
disallow jury trial as it sees fit regardless of the defendants’
wishes.7
In other words, the Supreme Court has read two
exceptions into Article III’s absolute textual requirement. 8
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(2009),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2008/front/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. It should be noted that in
state courts, around 60% of all felony trials are nonjury. See State Court
Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004—Table 4.1. Distribution of Types of Felony
Convictions in State Courts, by Offense, 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.cfm#
(last
updated Oct. 22, 2011).
4. I derive this figure by adding to the statistics on Table D-4, 2008
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 244 tbl.D-4; the statistics on Table M-1A
Class A Misdemeanor Defendants Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges, by
Type of Disposition; and Table M-2A Petty Offense Defendants Disposed of by
U.S. Magistrate Judges, by Type of Disposition, id. at 358 tbl.M-1A, 364 tbl.M2A. These additional trials are conducted by federal magistrates, not Article III
judges. I include them because magistrate criminal trials are permissible only
because of the petty crime and jury waiver exceptions discussed in this Article.
5. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298–300 (1930)
(upholding defendant’s jury waiver in a federal criminal trial), abrogated by
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
6. The line between “petty” and “serious” crime has varied over the years.
Compare Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (offenses
punishable by a maximum prison term of six months or a maximum fine of $500
are considered petty), with D.C. v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625–26 (1937)
(distinguishing petty from serious crime through complex balancing test), and
Comment, The Petty Offense Category and Trial by Jury, 40 YALE L.J. 1303,
1306 (1931) (discussing the federal courts’ “flexible test”). Suffice it to say that
the Supreme Court has always said that all felonies are “serious” offenses, while
some misdemeanors are “serious” and others are “petty.” See, e.g., Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1888). The current line between petty and
serious crime is defined by Blanton. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.
7. See, e.g., Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (1994).
8. For convenience, I am considering only criminal prosecutions of
civilians. There is no jury trial right in the military justice system. See Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1942). I believe, but will not demonstrate, that
there is no textual warrant for the military trial exception. However, it so
clearly comports with the unquestioned practice of military justice before,
during, and after the Founding that it is proper to conclude that military trials
were intended to be outside the scope of Article III, Section 2’s command.
Although aspects of the military justice exception have evolved with
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One of these exceptions, the petty offense exception, may be
justified by English, colonial, and Founding-era practices.9
Before, during, and after the period of constitution-making,
minor criminal offenses were subject to summary trial. 10
Criminal procedure contemporary with the Founding strongly
suggests that the Constitution was unlikely to require juries
for every federal criminal prosecution no matter how trivial.11
The second exception—for federal bench trials for serious
criminal offenses when the defendant has waived his right to
a jury—is another matter. Federal bench trials premised
upon defendant’s jury waiver cannot be justified by
constitutional text, common law history, or Founding-era
practices. 12 By the norms of any textualist or originalist
jurisprudence, federal bench trials for serious crimes are
unconstitutional even when defendants request them. They
may be justified only by jurisprudences that allow for
evolving principles and a “living constitution.”
Moreover, for one-hundred-forty years after the
Founding, federal practice, professional opinion, and Supreme
Court precedent agreed that bench trials for serious criminal
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contemporary constitutional norms, the exception itself is consonant with
Founding-era norms that have remained constant. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957) (holding even when living overseas, civilian dependents of military
personnel have a right to a jury trial). For many years criminal contempt of
court was an additional exception to the jury trial requirement. This exception
was grounded in common law tradition. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F.
Cas. 359, 364–65, 367 (C.C. Pa. 1801) (No. 6,616). Now criminal contempt
convictions are subject to a jury trial requirement that is consonant with the
rules that distinguish petty from serious crime. Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions
for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655,
692–95, 732 n.422 (2008).
9. Whether these practices justify the petty offense exception depends on
one’s jurisprudence. As I will discuss in a subsequent article, textualism may
not find them sufficient.
10. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 32 (1965); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280–83; Felix Frankfurter & Thomas Corcoran,
Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. REV. 917, 922–65 (1926).
11. I make this assertion with two caveats. First, there is some evidentiary
basis for concluding that Article III’s jury trial provision was meant to enact an
encompassing ban. Second, there is convincing evidence that the line now
drawn between petty and serious offenses reflects contemporary policy views
rather than Founding-era practices. These caveats will be the topic of a
subsequent paper.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 24–69.
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offenses were barred by Article III’s jury-trial mandate. 13
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, in his 1890 Lectures on
the Constitution, captured the uniform thinking of Founding
era and nineteenth century American jurists when he said
that “the language used in Article III is peremptory that ‘the
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury.’ This language excludes other all modes, whether with
or without consent of the party.”14
Nonetheless, in Patton v. United States, 15 decided in
1930, a unanimous Supreme Court declared federal
bench trials constitutionally permissible.16 The author of the
opinion, Justice George Sutherland, was second to none in his
commitment to the view that the sole goal of constitutional
interpretation is to maintain and effectuate the Constitution’s
original meaning.17 Employing his originalist approach in
Patton, Sutherland maintained that defendants’ jury waiver
and federal bench trials for serious offenses were consistent
with Article III’s original understanding.18
However, in Patton, Justice Sutherland got his history
wrong. Thus this Article joins the long list of books and
articles questioning the Supreme Court’s use of history as a
basis for its decisions.19 In addition, by studying how evolving
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13. See infra text accompanying notes 70–104, 169–70.
14. SAMUEL MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 500 (1891) (emphasis in original) (second emphasis added). Miller
continued that “[a] party may, however, confess his guilt by a plea of guilty, and
judgment may be passed upon that plea, yet if there is an issue of fact which
has to be tried, that trial can only be by a jury.” Id.; see also William Handley,
Jr., Some Observations on Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 TEX. L. &
LEG. 45, 48 (1947) (saying Article III’s jury provision “would seem to be
mandatory in nature and for many years were so construed by the federal
courts”).
15. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
16. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297–98 (1930).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 183–91.
18. Since this Article’s focus is solely on jury waiver in prosecutions for
“serious” crimes, from this point on the unmodified terms “offenses” and
“crimes” should be understood to mean “serious offenses” and “serious crimes.”
When it speaks of “petty” offenses, it will employ the adjective “petty.”
19. See, e.g., CHARLES MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
HISTORY 68–69, 195–96 (1969) (explicating examples of the Court’s “misuse” of
history); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Alfred
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965);
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David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original
Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in
Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009) (criticizing the Court’s use
of history in D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)); Sanford Levinson, For Whom is
the Heller Opinion Important and Why?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 315, 327
(2009) (criticizing both the majority’s and minority’s use of history in D.C. v.
Heller).
20. At least originalists on the bench, where despite teams of clerks there is
less time for study and, despite life tenure, greater pressure not to follow the
dictates of history even when they are discernible than there is among
originalists in the legal academy.
21. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 480 (1990); see infra notes 408–33.
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principles of constitutional policy transformed the
interpretation of Article III, Section 2’s clear text, this Article
reveals an important mechanism through which evolving
principles of constitutional policy become the basis for
constitutional law even in the hands of dedicated
originalists:20 “motivated reasoning.”21
This Article is a study of the problem that motivated
reasoning presents for the practice of originalist
jurisprudence, and to that extent, it is an argument for the
desirability of a forthright jurisprudence of “living
constitutionalism.”
Part I discusses the history of the “no-waiver” rule which
the Patton case overturned.
Part I demonstrates that
constitutional text, common law tradition, early federal
practice, Supreme Court precedent and nineteenth-century
legal theory all support the conclusion that Article III’s jury
provision established a per se rule banning bench trials
regardless of defendants’ consent. It is written from the
perspective of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
lawyers and judges in order to establish both the original
understanding of the Constitution on the subject of
defendants’ jury waiver and adherence to that understanding
throughout the nineteenth century.
Part II studies the first three decades of the twentieth
century to show that although there were a few dissenting
voices, the no-waiver rule remained solidly in place until the
Patton decision. Part III discusses Patton and is divided into
two sections. The first section analyzes Justice Sutherland’s
opinion to show that its attempt to ground the
constitutionality of federal bench trials in the Constitution’s
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original meaning is remarkably inadequate for establishing
its revisionist claims. The second section accounts for Justice
Sutherland’s jejune opinion. After discussing social, legal,
and historiographical developments in the 1920s, the second
section portrays the Patton Court’s departure from the clear
command of the Constitution’s text, tradition, and precedent
not as bad-faith “result-oriented” jurisprudence but as an
example of “motivated reasoning,” a largely unconscious and
uncontrollable process.
Part IV concludes with the implications of this analysis
for
the
debate
between
originalist
and
“living”
constitutionalism. It argues that motivated reasoning is so
endemic to lawyers and judges when they “do history” that it
has jurisprudential ramifications in our increasingly
originalist era. Historians have long questioned the Supreme
Court’s use of history.22 The psychological phenomenon of
“motivated reasoning” provides an explanation for why the
Justices will never be good historians and suggests that we
should think long and hard before continuing our current
embrace of Clio as the determining metric of contemporary
government structure and civil liberties.
I. ARTICLE III’S JURY TRIAL MANDATE FROM THE FOUNDING
TO 1900: THE NO-WAIVER RULE ESTABLISHED AND RESPECTED

04/16/2012 17:10:32

22. See Stephen A. Siegel, How Many Critiques Must Historians Write?, 45
TULSA L. REV. 823, 823–24 (2010) (book review).
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The goal of this part is two-fold: to establish that the
original meaning of Article III’s jury trial mandate did not
permit jury waiver, and that this “no-waiver” understanding
was respected throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
century.
This combined goal will be accomplished by
discussing the law from the perspective of a late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth century jurist because the ultimate
purpose of this Article is to contrast what was believed to be
true in 1900 with what came to be accepted in 1930. I am
less interested in determining the Constitution’s “true”
original meaning with respect to jury waiver, although I
think I do that, than in illustrating how beliefs about original
meaning change over time.
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A snapshot of constitutional law in 1900 shows that
defendants who plead not guilty in federal criminal trials
could not waive a jury trial. 23 There was near universal
agreement among late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century judges, lawyers and commentators that the no-waiver
rule was fully justified by the Constitution’s text, English and
colonial tradition, early federal practice, Supreme Court
precedent, and legal theory.
A. The Constitution’s Text
To late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists,
Article III, Section 2 was an “explicit”24 and “peremptory”25
provision mandating “that in the trial of criminal causes
other than impeachments a jury could not be dispensed with
by consent of the accused or otherwise.”26 “The provisions of
section 2 of article 3”, they said, “point out absolutely the
tribunal which must dispose of the crimes to which they
refer,”27 and that “tribunal . . . consists of a jury, and . . . a
court . . . with a judge or judges.” 28 Jury waiver was
impossible because “no prosecuting officer nor any person
accused, whether acting separately or by agreement, can
substitute . . . another tribunal for that which the letter of the
Constitution designates.”29 As future Supreme Court Justice
Horace Lurton wrote when he was still an appellate court
judge,
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 51 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

23. I use the word “crime” to denote “serious,” not “petty,” offenses. See
cases cited supra notes 5–6 (discussing the distinction between serious and
petty crime).
24. State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 363–66 (1878) (distinguishing the state
constitution’s jury provision from the federal constitution’s because of its
differing draftsmanship).
25. MILLER, supra note 14, at 500; see also Dickinson v. United States, 159
F. 801, 806 (1st Cir. 1908).
26. In re Staff, 23 N.W. 587, 589 (Wis. 1885) (distinguishing state
constitutions from the federal constitution because of differing draftsmanship);
see also Note, Trial by Jury for Petty Offenses, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1905)
(Article III, Section 2 “on its face, appears to be absolute, with the single
mentioned exception”).
27. Dickinson, 159 F. at 806.
28. Id.; see also id. at 806–07 (“[T]he third article points out perfectly the
elements of the tribunal authorized to proceed against persons accused of
crimes like that before us, including equally the court, the judge and the
jury . . . .”).
29. Id. at 806.
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[Article III’s jury] provision is not one merely extending a
privilege or guaranteeing a right. It is all that and more.
The “trial” of every such crime “shall be by jury.” It goes
to the constitution of the tribunal, and a “trial” for a
“crime” which is not “by jury” is not a trial by any tribunal
known to the Constitution.30

According to Justice John Marshall Harlan, the near
universally held view was that for serious crime:
Under the express words of Constitution . . . . [t]he court
and the jury, not separately, but together, constitute the
appointed tribunal which alone, under the law, can try the
question of crime, the commission of which by the accused
is put in issue by a plea of not guilty.31

If anything in the Constitution’s text casts a shadow of a
doubt on Justices Lurton’s and Harlan’s propositions, it came
not from Article III but from the Sixth Amendment which
declared that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the state and district where in the crime shall have been
committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.32

04/16/2012 17:10:32

30. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 90 (6th Cir. 1909); see also MILLER,
supra note 14, at 500 (quoting supra text accompanying note 14). The only pre1900 source I have found that questions the no-waiver rule in federal
prosecutions for serious crime is Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 25 (D.C. Cir.
1894).
31. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan dissent in Schick objected to the Court’s recognition of the petty
offense exception. Id. Harlan read Article III’s absolute text to prohibit jury
waiver for petty, as well as for serious, offenses. See id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 34; see also Low, 169 F. at 91 (discussing whether
“verbiage” of the Sixth Amendment creates a waivable privilege). But see Rollin
Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases (pt. 1), 16 IOWA L. REV. 20,
44 (1930) (noting that earlier in the nineteenth century it was common to read
provisions similar to the Sixth Amendment as mandatory).
34. See, e.g., Schick, 195 U.S. at 71–72 (mentioning waivable Sixth
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By common agreement, the Sixth Amendment’s
introductory clause was “permissive”33 and allowed waiver of
many of the trial-related rights the amendment mentions.34
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Many Gilded Age jurists thought the contrast between Article
III’s peremptory, and the Sixth Amendment’s permissive,
language created a tension between the two provisions.35 The
tension stemmed from the fact that the Sixth Amendment
customarily is read as guaranteeing the right to a jury trial as
well as the trial’s accessory rights. 36 Reading the Sixth
Amendment this way left the Constitution with two
potentially conflicting jury trial guarantees.37 The conflict is
that Article III’s jury provision is drafted with “absolute”38
phrasing while the Sixth Amendment’s provision is embedded
in language of personal privilege, which implies that it might
be “enjoyed” or not at the defendant’s option.39 Gilded Age
jurists thought that if the Constitution’s two criminal-jurytrial provisions were in tension, this might support an
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Amendment rights); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 810–11 (1st Cir.
1908) (saying some Sixth Amendment rights are waivable and some are not);
MILLER, supra note 14, at 499–500; James A. C. Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in
Felony Cases, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 132, 147 (1931) (saying the Sixth Amendment
“merely” provides that “ ‘ the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial by . . .
jury’ ” ); Perkins, supra note 33, at 46 (contrasting Article III’s and the Sixth
Amendment’s language).
35. It should be noted that some jurists thought the contrasting language
provided additional intra-textual argument supporting the no-waiver
understanding of Article III’s jury provision. See Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 34.
36. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994). “[T]he Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial” was extended to the states in Duncan v.
Louisiana. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 381 U.S. 145 (1968)). See also, e.g.,
WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1, at 1069 (5th ed. 2009)
(discussing the “Sixth Amendment right to jury trial”); Sanjay Chhablani,
Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 505–06, 511–12
(2009); Matthew Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth
Amendment’s Right to Jury Trial Post-Booker, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2007);
Grant, supra note 34, at 147. By accessory rights I mean the adjunct rights,
such as rights to counsel and confrontation that make a jury trial worth having.
37. I do not see the potential textual conflict. Historically, Article III
created the right to jury trial and the Sixth Amendment specified some of its
appurtenant rights. See infra text accompanying notes 42–46. This historical
understanding comports with the way the Sixth Amendment is written. The
Sixth Amendment reads simply as a specification of trial-related rights; the
noun “trial” appears only as a referent for the adjectives “public,” and “speedy”;
and the noun “jury” plays a similar role for the adjective “impartial.” The Sixth
Amendment clearly assumes a right to jury trial, a drafting approach that made
sense in 1791 given Article III’s explicit guarantee. I suspect the Sixth
Amendment today is looked upon as a source of the trial right itself due to the
belief, which is analytically incorrect, that for the Fourteenth Amendment to
incorporate a trial guarantee against the states it must be in the Bill of Rights.
38. Note, supra note 26, at 48.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (saying “the accused shall enjoy the right”).
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40. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904); Low v. United
States, 169 F. 86, 91 (6th Cir. 1909); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801,
810–11 (1st Cir. 1908); Grant, supra note 34, at 147 n.105 (citing material on
the “clash of opinion regarding the effect of Amendment 6 on Article III, § 2”).
41. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1888).
42. Id. at 548.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 549–50; see also Schick, 195 U.S. at 78 (Harlan, J. dissenting); cf.
Low, 169 F. at 91 (reviewing Callan).
45. Schick, 195 U.S. at 78.
46. Id. (mentioning concerns such as “secret” or “indefinitely postponed”
trials); see also Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1197–98 (1991).
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argument that the Sixth Amendment’s permissive
declaration, being the later enactment, “must control, under
the well-understood rule that the last expression of the will of
the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”40
The suggestion that the Sixth Amendment was intended
to supplant Article III’s jury provision was raised and
authoritatively rejected by the Supreme Court in 1888 in
Callan v. Wilson.41 “There is no necessary conflict between
[the two constitutional provisions],”42 Justice Harlan wrote on
behalf of a unanimous Court. Article III guarantees trial
by jury, without detailing the content of that right,
Harlan noted.43 Therefore, “[T]he enumeration, in the sixth
amendment, of the rights of the accused . . . is to be taken as
a declaration of what those rules were, and is to be referred to
the anxiety of the people of the states to have in the supreme
law of the land . . . a full and distinct recognition of those
rules.”44
For Justice Harlan and the Callan Court, the absence of
conflict between the Constitution’s two criminal-jury trial
provisions meant that Article III, with its mandatory
language, was the dominant provision and the Sixth
Amendment, with its more privilege-like phraseology, was
adopted to define with greater specificity “the essential
features of the trial required by § 2 of article 3.”45 It was
adopted not to weaken Article III’s jury trial mandate but to
elaborate it and quiet the Antifederalists’ fears that, through
lack of detail, Article III had enshrined an empty right.46
That a criminal defendant might waive some of his common
law trial rights, as specified in the Sixth Amendment, did not
in any way undercut Article III’s absolute command that the

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 53 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC

384

3/14/2012 2:57:38 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

trial itself must be by jury.
By turning to well-known facts about the constitution’s
ratification, Justice Harlan resolved the tension between the
Constitution’s two criminal-trial provisions in a way that
fully vindicated Article III’s peremptory command. Harlan’s
position, and rationale, expressed the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries’ understanding of the Sixth
Amendment’s relation to Article III’s unwaivable jury-trial
requirement.47
B. Common Law Tradition
To interpret the Constitution, late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century jurists turned not only to the document’s
text but also to common law tradition. The Constitution
“must be read in light of the common law,” 48 they said,
because “its provisions are framed in the language of the
English common law”49 and the common law “is the system
from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are
derived.” 50 Moreover, the common law’s “principles and
history . . . were familiarly known to the framers.”51
Gilded Age jurists thought common law principles and
history unquestionably supported the no-waiver understanding of Article III’s peremptory text. According to the
early common law, defendants in criminal proceedings could
plead guilty,52 demand trial by battle,53 choose a jury trial,54
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 53 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

47. See, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91; Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 810–
11 (1st Cir. 1908). Schick v. United States has dicta indicating that if there
were a conflict between the two provisions, the Sixth Amendment would prevail
in absence of common law considerations, but that observation had no influence
given Callan’s determination that there was none. Schick, 195 U.S. at 68–70;
see also, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91; Dickinson, 159 F. at 810–11.
48. Schick, 195 U.S. at 69.
49. Id. (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)).
50. Id. (quoting Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875)).
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)).
52. Though guilty pleas were an option at common law, English and
American judges discouraged them at least until the second half of the
nineteenth century. Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (1979); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short
History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 264–65 (1979).
53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *346–49; United States v. Gibert, 25 F.
Cas. 1287, 1305 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–204).
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *349–52; Erwin N. Griswold, The
Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L.
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or stand mute and be subject to peine forte
et dure (which meant being crushed to death).55 By the lateeighteenth century, peine and forte had been abolished, and
defendants who stood mute were considered to have pled
guilty.56 Even though trial by battle remained an option for
defendants being prosecuted privately through the appeal of
felony proceeding,57 the battle-option was not permitted for
the vast majority of defendants who were prosecuted through
proceedings commenced by indictment or information.58 Thus
by the late-eighteenth century, almost all English criminal
defendants were limited to three choices: pleading guilty,
refusing to plead and being considered guilty, or trial by
jury.59
In short, the doctrine of the English common law was
that jury trials for criminal defendants were not mandatory.
Defendants could choose among modes of trial and had to
elect to “put [themselves] upon the country.”60 At no time
prior to the Constitution’s adoption did defendants charged
with felonies have the option of waiving a jury and being tried
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REV. 655, 657 (1934) (emphasizing that “consent was the very basis of jury
trial”). Trial by battle was a common law mode of trial in which the truth of the
matter was decided by armed conflict between the parties or their champions.
It survived in England into the modern era. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *337–41.
55. Langbein, supra note 52, at 268. The practice is detailed in Gibert.
Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1304 (Story, J.).
56. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305; Griswold, supra note 54, at 657. The statute
ending peine and forte and entering a guilty plea for mute defendants was
passed by Parliament in 1772. Griswold, supra note 54, at 657 (citing Felony
and Piracy Act, 1772, 12 Geo. 3, c. 20, § 1. (Eng.)).
57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *312–17, *346–47; William Riddell,
Appeal of Death and Its Abolition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 786, 804–05 (1926). The
right to demand trial by battle in response to a civil proceeding begun by a writ
of right also survived. See Riddell, supra, at 803. Trial by battle in both actions
was abolished by Parliament in 1819. Id. at 808; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 484, 494 n.11 (John McIntyre Cooley ed., 3d ed. 1884) (citing
Appeal of Murder, etc., 1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.)).
58. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305.
59. Parliament changed the law 1827 so that after that date defendants who
refused to plead were considered to have plead not guilty. Frank Grinnell, To
What Extent Is the Right to Jury Trial Optional in Criminal Cases in
Massachusetts, 8 MASS. L.Q. (No. 5) 7, 47 (1923); Griswold, supra note 54, at
657 (citing Criminal Law Act, 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, § 2 (Eng.)).
60. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *344. Blackstone explains the phrase by
saying “the jury” is understood to be “country.” Id.
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by the bench.61
The American colonies and the states in the early
Republic generally followed English practice, with a few
exceptions. According to Gilded Age and early-twentiethcentury jurists, trial by battle was never introduced into
America62 and refusals to plead were entered as a plea of “not
guilty.”63 Peine and forte was not considered to have been
introduced either, 64 despite there having been a notorious
instance of it during the Salem Witch hysteria.65 Although
subsequent research has altered the picture somewhat, 66
throughout the nineteenth- and early-twentieth- centuries,
jurists were certain that according to colonial and Foundingera criminal procedure, defendants charged with serious
offenses had only two choices: plead guilty or be tried by a
jury. Bench trial predicated on defendant’s jury waiver was
unknown in the early Republic.67
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61. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1965); Dickinson v. United
States, 159 F. 801, 805 (1st Cir. 1908) (discussing the constitutionality of a jury
with less than twelve people); Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench
Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 123, 123 (1982); Recent
Decisions, Power of Defendant on Trial for Penitentiary Offense to Waive a Jury
Trial, 30 COLUM. L. REV, 1063, 1063 (1930). The jury waiver rule for
misdemeanors is unclear. Dickinson, 159 F. at 805. The English procedure
known as “submission” does not contradict my point as it was used exclusively
for minor crimes. See Towne, supra, at 136. For a discussion of the English
retreat from the no-waiver rule, see infra note 268.
62. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305.
63. Id.; see also Grinnell, supra note 59, at 47–48 (discussing colonial
Massachusetts).
64. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305 (saying peine and forte was never introduced).
65. See ARTHUR MILLER, The Crucible: A Play in Four Acts, in COLLECTED
PLAYS 1944–1961, at 343, 446–47 (2006) (Elizabeth Proctor describing Giles
Cory’s refusal to plead and his death by “pressing”); Giles Corey, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giles_Corey (last updated Oct. 12, 2011) (saying
that during the Salem witch trials Giles Corey refused to plead and was crushed
to death with heavy stones). In an introductory note, Miller vouches for the
historical accuracy of “the fate of each character.” MILLER, supra, at 345.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 324–96 (discussing subsequent
research).
67. Towne, supra note 61, at 145. Towne’s conclusion and my discussion
must be read with the understanding that jury trial rights did not attach to
petty offenses, see supra text accompanying notes 6–7, and that the
petty/serious offense boundary was more generous than it is today, see
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 922–65 (discussing petty offenses in
eighteenth-century England and colonial America). See also supra note 6.
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C. Federal Practice and Supreme Court Precedent
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists also
found solid support for the no-waiver understanding of Article
III’s jury trial mandate in the unbroken history of federal
practice and Supreme Court precedent.
As for early federal practice, the Supreme Court tells us
that “[i]n no known federal criminal case in the period
immediately following the adoption of the Constitution did a
defendant claim that he had the right to insist upon a trial
without a jury.” 68 Nor did an eighteenth- or nineteenthcentury Congress ever adopt or even consider a statute
allowing defendants to ask for a bench trial.69
In addition, the no-waiver rule reflects the way Supreme
Court Justices read Article III, Section 2 throughout the
nineteenth century. Perhaps because the Constitution’s text
and common-law tradition were so clear, there is almost no
case law discussion of the issue before the last third of the
nineteenth century. The sole exception was remarks made by
Justice Joseph Story in the course of a trial he presided over
while riding circuits. The proceeding,70 which involved the
trial of the officers and crew of a Spanish schooner for piracy,
was a major prosecution that implicated international
affairs. 71 When, after a fifteen-day trial, 72 the jury found
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68. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
69. Congress may well have thought that jury waiver was not permitted.
Early federal legislation contemplated jury trial and made no provision for a
bench trial for a defendant who preferred one. The earliest congressional
statute authorizing jury waiver and bench trial was passed in 1892. It was
limited to misdemeanors prosecuted in the Washington, D.C. Police Court. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 536, 26 Stat. 848, §§ 1–2 (1891); Lester Orfield, Trial by
Jury in Federal Criminal Procedure, 1962 DUKE L. J. 29, 59. At the very end of
the nineteenth century, a few lower court judges began to express a contrary
view. Belt contains the earliest expressions. See Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 33–34.
See Orfield, supra, at 59–61 (discussing federal case law); infra text
accompanying notes 155–69 (discussing the dissenting cases). I am speaking
only about interpretations of the federal constitution. For early state court
discussions of jury waiver as a matter of state constitutional law, see Cancemi
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 134–39 (1858); Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498, 500 (Mo.
1847)
70. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–
204).
71. Id. at 1289 n.2. The trial was celebrated enough for a stand-alone report
to be published by CONG. STENOGRAPHER, A REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF PEDRO
GIBERT (1834). Gibert is remembered mainly for Justice Story’s ruling that the
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars judges from granting a motion
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some defendants guilty, their attorneys moved to arrest
judgment and asked for a new trial.73 Among the attorneys’
objections was one faulting the proceedings because at the
defendants’ arraignment, after they pled not guilty, “the clerk
of the court . . . did not . . . ask the prisoners how they would
be tried, so that they did not make the usual and common
reply, ‘By God and the country.’ ” 74 Instead, upon motion of
the district attorney, the presiding judge immediately
assigned a trial date.75
The gist of the objection was that the arraignment had
skipped the traditional step of allowing the defendants the
choice of determining how they would be tried. At common
law, where there were alternate modes of trial and painful
consequences for choosing none of them, jury trials were
improper without the defendant’s consent.76
Justice Story easily rejected the objection. Even though
years ago in England it would have been well-taken, in
America the objection was anachronistic and trivial. “[I]n
America,” he said, “the only trial since the first settlement of
the country has always, in criminal cases, been by a jury; and
could not be in any other manner.”77 Yet, because Gibert was
a death penalty case, Story responded to this anachronistic
objection with a learned and lengthy analysis78 in the course
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for a new trial “whether there be a verdict of acquittal or conviction.” Gibert, 25
F. Cas. at 1301. Story’s view was never the dominant federal view and was
eventually rejected by the Supreme Court. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 189 (1957) (discussing Gibert and its rejection); id. at 199–205
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 n.6
(1965). Story thought the remedy for error at trial was for the judge to follow
English practice and ask the President to pardon the defendant or mitigate his
sentence. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1297, 1302–03; see also Justin Curtis, The
Meaning of Life (or Limb): An Originalist Proposal for Double Jeopardy Reform,
41 U. RICH. L. REV. 991, 1016–19 (2007) (attributing to Gibert the view that
Double Jeopardy applies only to capital offenses, which also did not win
acceptance as federal law).
72. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1287.
73. Id. at 1294.
74. Id. at 1303–04.
75. Id. at 1304.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 52–56.
77. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305.
78. Id. at 1303. Story’s response took over 2700 words; it fills three large
pages of the reports. Id. at 1303–06. Perhaps Justice Story was also trying to
show the fairness of the American legal system to foreigners who were going to
be executed by it.
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of which he asserted:
The constitution has expressly declared, “that the trial of
all crimes . . . shall be by jury.” It is imperative upon the
courts, and prisoners can be lawfully tried in no other
manner.
....
[W]hat is the reason, . . . at the common law, of asking the
prisoner how he will be tried? It is to ascertain whether
he consents to a trial by jury . . . . I deem it a little short of
an absurdity in the courts of the United States to call
upon the prisoners, after they have pleaded guilty, to say
how they will be tried, when the constitution and laws
have peremptorily required the trial to be by jury.
Suppose the prisoners had been asked, how they would be
tried, and they had answered that they wished for no trial
at all; must not the court have proceeded to try they upon
the plea of not guilty? Suppose they had answered that
they wished to be tried by the court, could the court have
done otherwise than order a trial by jury? . . . The
constitution decides how he shall be tried, independent of
any election on his part.79

04/16/2012 17:10:32

79. Id. at 1305–06. Also relevant are Justice Story’s remarks concerning
states which have constitutional provisions similar to Article III, Section 2:
[I]t seems to me, that in all those states, where the constitution
provides that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury, and the prisoner
pleads not guilty, it is a mere mockery to ask him how he will be tried,
for the constitution has already declared how it shall be.
Id. at 1305.
80. Orfield, supra note 69, at 56; see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24, 31 (1965) (“[I]n . . . Gibert, . . . Story . . . indicated his view that the
Constitution made trial by jury the only permissible method of trial.”); State v.
Soper, 16 Me. 293, 297 (1839); Amar, supra note 46, at 1196 & n.290 (citing
Gibert); Appleman, supra note 2, at 441 (“Justice Story . . . contended that jury
trial was the only permissible method of trial.”).
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Admittedly, these remarks are dicta since they were not
made in response to the question of whether a defendant in a
federal criminal trial could waive his right to a jury trial and
be tried solely by a judge. Nonetheless, courts and scholars
have read them to stand for the proposition that Justice Story
“did not admit the possibility of waiver of jury trial.”80
After the Civil War, commentary on jury waiver by
Supreme Court Justices continued in the same vein as Justice
Story’s in Gibert. But now the remarks were made in
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opinions in which the Justices spoke for the Supreme Court.
In 1874, in developing analogies supporting one of the early
unconstitutional conditions decisions81 protecting out-of-state
corporations from state laws requiring that they waive their
right to remove cases to federal court when sued by in-state
plaintiffs, Justice Ward Hunt approvingly cited the leading
state court anti-jury waiver case in the course of saying:
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his
substantial rights. In a criminal case, he cannot, as was
held in Cancemi’s Case, be tried in any other manner than
by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in open court
to be tried by a jury of eleven men.82

Then in 1898, in Thompson v. Utah, 83 Justice John
Marshall Harlan asserted the no-waiver principle as a
necessary support for the Supreme Court’s ruling that the
Constitution’s jury trial mandate not only required twelveperson juries but also prevented defendants from consenting
to trial by a smaller jury. In Thompson, the defendant
was convicted of larceny in a Utah state court by a jury
composed of eight men.84 Since Utah’s constitution expressly
authorized eight-person juries in all but capital cases,85 the
Utah Supreme Court easily upheld Thompson’s conviction
under Utah law.86
Throughout the nineteenth century, a valid conviction
under state law normally would have ended the matter.87
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B
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81. Unconstitutional conditions arise when government conditions its
extension of benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right. For discussions of
the doctrine, see, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 534–36, 946–50 (2d ed. 2002).
82. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (citation omitted).
Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) was a leading state court expression of
the no-waiver principle.
83. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
84. Id. at 344.
85. See State v. Bates, 47 P. 78, 79 (Utah 1896) (quoting UTAH CONST. of
1896 art. I, § 10).
86. State v. Thompson, 50 P. 409, 410 (Utah 1897) (relying on Bates, 47 P.
at 79 (quoting UTAH CONST. of 1896 art. I, § 10)).
87. See, e.g., Corrinna Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking
the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1361, 1369–71 (2004) (saying before incorporation of the Bill of Rights
state criminal defendants had no recourse to federal court); Anthony O’Rourke,
The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45 GA. L. REV. 721, 727
(2011) (saying prior to the 1920s it was not expected that the Supreme Court
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would review state criminal trials and develop doctrine to aid state court
defendants).
88. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post
facto law . . . .”).
89. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 344.
90. Id. at 349.
91. Id. at 352. The Utah court had rejected Thompson’s Ex Post Facto
argument because it incorrectly regarded jury trial as a changeable procedural
right. Thompson, 50 P. at 410 (relying on Bates, 47 P. at 80–81).
92. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 353.
93. Id.
94. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 574 (1884).
95. Id. at 578–79. The specific facts of Hopt involved the defendant not
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The Thompson case, however, involved unique facts that
allowed Thompson to raise an objection grounded in the
federal Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause,88 which was one
of the few rights provisions in the national charter that bound
the states. The facts were that Utah became a state in 1896
and Thompson had committed his crime in 1895 when
Utah was still a federal territory.89 At the time Thompson
committed his crime, the federal Constitution’s jury
provisions applied. Unlike the Utah constitution, the federal
Constitution’s jury trial guarantee meant “a jury constituted,
as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor
less.”90 Given that Thompson’s right to a twelve-person jury
was a “substantial right,” a “right that was regarded, at the
time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the
protection of life and liberty,” any material change in it was
impermissibly ex post facto.91
When Thompson’s case reached the United States
Supreme Court, Utah attempted to defend against application
of the Ex Post Facto Clause by arguing that Thompson had
waived his federal jury trial right by not “object[ing] until
after verdict, to a trial jury composed of eight persons.”92
Justice Harlan’s response to Utah’s waiver argument was
divided into four parts. First, he succinctly ruled that “[i]t is
sufficient to say that it was not in the power of one accused of
felony, by consent expressly given or by his silence, to
authorize a jury of only eight persons to pass upon the
question of his guilt.”93 Then Justice Harlan supported his
ruling by quoting at length from Hopt v. Utah,94 a decade old
case that said the defendant’s right to be present at his
trial is not waivable.95 The Hopt Court’s view, which was
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reasserted in Thompson, was that the pro-waiver argument:
necessarily proceeds upon the ground that [the defendant]
alone is concerned as to the mode by which he may be
deprived of his life or liberty, and the chief object of the
prosecution is to punish him for the crime charged . . . .
[However] the public has an interest in his life and liberty
. . . . That which the law makes essential in proceedings
involving the deprivation of life and liberty cannot be
dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused,
much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in
custody, to object to unauthorized methods. The great end
of punishment is not the expiation of atonement of the
offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses of
the same kind. Such being the relation which the citizen
holds to the public, and the object of punishment for public
wrongs, . . . [i]f he be deprived of his life or liberty without
being so present, such deprivation would be without that
due process of law required by the constitution.96

04/16/2012 17:10:32

being present at voir dire. In the 1930s, Hopt was criticized as “dicta.” Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 118 n.2 (1934). This was just after Thompson
suffered a similar fate. See infra text accompanying notes 201–07. Hopt has
since been substantially cut back. Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process:
Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 129 &
n.55 (1999). The demise of the rule against jury waiver recounted in this paper
was the leading edge of a general revision of thinking about waiver of the
Constitution’s trial-related rights. See id. at 125–32; infra text accompanying
notes 105–51.
96. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 354 (quoting Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579).
97. Id. at 354–55.
98. Id. at 355. In Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892), the Court ruled
that where state law permitted jury waiver in state court prosecutions of state
crimes there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Thus in Thompson, the rule against jury waiver was only because of
Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment.
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After this telling quote, Justice Harlan connected Hopt to
Thompson by reasoning: “If one under trial for a felony . . .
could not legally consent that the trial proceed in his absence,
still less could he assent to be deprived of his liberty by a
tribunal not authorized by law to determine his guilt.”97 And
he concluded that “[i]n our opinion . . . the Constitution of the
United States gave the accused . . . the right to be tried by a
jury of twelve persons, and made it impossible to deprive him
of his liberty except by the unanimous verdict of such a
jury.”98

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 58 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/22/2012 2:25:56 PM

THE CONSTITUTION ON TRIAL

393

Even though Justice Harlan’s opinion in Thompson dealt
with the problem of consent to a jury composed of less than
twelve persons, it was understood by lower court judges to
stand as well for the proposition that federal bench trials
were unconstitutional.99 All early-twentieth century federal
appellate courts that addressed or commented on the issue
took that stance.100 So did several trial and territorial
courts.101 These cases elaborated on Thompson’s “the public
is interested” rationale and discussed why defendants could
waive some constitutional rights, such as their right to a jury
in civil cases, and their right to object to a juror’s
impartiality, but not others. The future Supreme Court
Justice Horace Lurton, while still a judge on the Sixth
Circuit, touched on many of these issues when he wrote:

04/16/2012 17:10:32

99. There was also some extension of the right. See, e.g., Freeman v. United
States, 227 F. 732, 759–60 (2d Cir. 1915) (whole trial must be heard by same
judge and same twelve jurors). One lower court went the opposite way but that
court’s ruling pre-dated the Thompson decision. See supra notes 30, 69
(discussing Belt v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1894)).
100. Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1923); Blair v. United
States, 241 F. 217, 230 (9th Cir. 1917); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 90 (6th
Cir. 1909); Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 804–12 (1st Cir. 1908).
101. In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500, 504–05 (D.C. Alaska 1916); In re McQuown,
91 P. 689, 689–90 (Okla Terr. 1907); see also Orfield, supra note 69, at 55–63
(for a review of relevant cases before and after Thompson).
102. Low, 169 F. at 91–92.
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The right to waive a right does not exist when the matter
concerns the public as well as the individual . . . . Between
the waiver of a jury in a civil case and its waiver in a trial
for crime there are fundamental differences. The one
involves only property rights of the parties, rights over
which they have dominion. The other involves the liberty
or life of the citizen. This is a matter over which the
accused has not dominion. The state, the public, are
concerned that neither shall be affected save by due
process of law . . . . Undoubtedly the accused has a right to
waive [also] everything which pertains to form and much
which is of the structure of a trial. But he may not waive
that which concerns both himself and the public, nor any
matter which involves fundamentally the jurisdiction of
the court. The jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a
judgment or conviction for crime, when there has been a
plea of not guilty, rests upon the foundation of a verdict by
a jury.102
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To this, Judge William Putnam of the First Circuit added
that the standard concern, in this formalist era, was that:
We have been unable to . . . frame any satisfactory rule by
which, if waivers [to the number of jurors] can be
sustained, the jury may not be made to consist of 1 man
instead of 12. The legal mind involuntarily rejects a
proposition that the jury might be so constituted
constitutionally; and yet we are unable to determine at
what point the weakening of the panel should stop unless
it might by consent be reduced to a single individual . . . .
except by the discretion of the judge; but, while,
necessarily the discretion of the judge is often interposed
in administering the civil law, and, to a certain extent the
criminal law, it seems wholly inappropriate that it should
be availed of in a matter of so grave a character as the
construction and practical application of the Constitution
of the United States. We are not able to accept a
proposition of that kind.103

For late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century jurists
the Constitution’s original meaning was clear. Common law
tradition and Supreme Court precedent complemented Article
III, Section 2’s absolute text. They all pointed to the
conclusion that in federal court a jury waiver followed by
bench trial could not be one of the defendant’s options. The
trial of all serious crimes had to be by jury.104
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103. Dickinson, 159 F. at 809; see also WILLIAM ATWELL, A TREATISE ON
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE 47 (1st ed. 1911) (similar argument).
Judge Putnam also found no contradiction in allowing civil jury waiver and
waiver of juror impartiality by observing that it was permitted by the common
law and, therefore, was a facet of the jury right the Constitution-makers placed
in the federal Constitution. Dickinson, 159 F. at 809.
104. I am speaking only of prosecutions that go to trial in the ordinary
federal courts. Military courts are not subject to Article III’s mandate.
Although in the nineteenth century, the exception for military trials was
coupled with a weak textual argument, the view that the all-inclusive language
of Article III was not intended to change common law practices is currently the
primary support for the holding that there is no jury trial right for defendants
in trials conducted by the military. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4–5, 50
(1957); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39–44 (1942) (relying on Revolutionary and
Founding era practices); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (relying on
inferences from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65,
78 (1857) (relying on inferences from Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2;
and the Eighth Amendment). Even though there is no jury trial right in civil
admiralty suits, see United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. 297 (1796) (no jury
required in civil admiralty), there is a right to a jury in criminal admiralty
prosecutions. This is because English admiralty courts, since the reign of Henry
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D. Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Theory: Jury Trial as
a Public Right
Although fully justified by constitutional text, history,
and precedent, a criminal defendant’s inability to waive
Article III’s jury trial mandate was more than a mere
fact of American constitutional law brought about by
some happenstance of legal history.105 It had widely-shared
practical, political, and theoretical justifications. As with any
central feature of a legal regime, it was supported by a host of
overlapping justifications, of greater or lesser strength, that
interconnected to build a structure of thought stronger and
more resilient than any one of the individual strands.
While some of the justifications may not resonate with
modern sensibilities, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the no-waiver rule had a host of practical and
theoretical supports. In colonial America, and perhaps in
England as well, judges surely would not have been
considered appropriate fact-finders and sole determiners of
guilt or innocence.106 Because judicial tenure for “good
behavior,” which was introduced into England in 1701, was
never extended to the colonies, 107 colonists tended to view
their judges, who served “at the King’s pleasure,”
with suspicion as agents of a remote government.108 In this
environment, one can easily imagine the colonists’ distrust of
the colonial judiciary being transferred over to the judges of
the new and distant national government and even to the
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A
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VIII, involved juries in their criminal cases. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441,
459–60 (1847) (contrasting English practice in civil and criminal admiralty);
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 44 (2d ed.
1975). Significantly, the early American cases also rely on Article III, Section
2’s absolute language. Waring, 46 U.S. at 481; United States v. New Bedford
Bridge, 27 F. Cas. 91, 110 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 15–867).
105. There was a vogue in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries to
trace facets of current law to anachronistic facets of medieval or ancient law.
The rule against jury waiver was subject to this analysis by its opponents. See
Dickinson, 159 F. at 820–21 (Aldrich, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying
notes 305–12.
106. In addition, before the “lawyerization” of the criminal trial in the earlynineteenth century, judges may not have been seen as available to serve as factfinder due to their role as advisor to the defendant and superintendent of the
“altercation” between the defendant, victim, and witnesses. Langbein, supra
note 52, at 264.
107. Siegel, supra note 8, at 699 n.241.
108. Langbein, supra note 52, at 269 (“crown hirelings”).
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judges of their own state. As John Langbein has written,
especially “[i]n America, where the judiciary’s association
with the excesses of English colonial administration had led
the framers to make jury trial a constitutional right, bench
trial was all the harder to envision.”109 In addition, in a legal
system in which every felony was a capital crime, judges
might themselves wish to avoid being the sole person to
determine whether defendants lived or died.110
Finally, according to recent scholarship on the history of
waiver of trial-related constitutional rights, the foundation of
the Constitution’s unwaivable jury trial mandate follows from
the fact that early America was a society in which rights
typically were inalienable.111 Although communitarian and
individualistic norms were intermixed, early America still
gave greater prominence to communitarian premises in its
public philosophy. 112 It was also a more paternalistic
society.113 In this society, rights tended to be conceived not as
private possessions but as “public goods” valorized for
protecting and promoting the public’s interest.114
Specifically with regard to jury trial, the public’s interest
was twofold. It was a means to protect defendants from
overreaching officials,115 as well as an instrument of popular
government serving a variety of related goals. 116 Most
specifically, as Jason Mazzone writes, “in the early years of
the Republic, jurors looked much more like judges than they
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B
04/16/2012 17:10:32

109. Id. (describing why England and America developed an adversary
criminal process rather than one that was bench-centered).
110. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 11; Langbein, supra note 52, at 270 (making
the point in relation to politically controversial cases).
111. King, supra note 95, at 119–21; Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 801, 850–54 (2003).
112. See, e.g., DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY 1–5, 37–
40, 169–71 (2007) (tracing differing property confiscation regimes during the
Revolution and the Civil War to shift from Republican to Liberal political
philosophy); Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67 TEX.
L. REV., 903, 915–18 (1989) (book review) (discussing Republicanism).
113. King, supra note 95, at 121 (relating the “demise of paternalism” as a
barrier to waiver to the “provision of defense counsel”).
114. See id. at 120–21; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850–55.
115. Appleman, supra note 2, at 408; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850–51.
116. AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 120–23 (1997); Appleman, supra note 2, at 408–39; Mazzone, supra
note 111, at 851–52 (discussing jury trial and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self-incrimination as public rights); see also King, supra note 95, at 126–
29 (discussing the Sixth Amendment right of “presence” as a public right).
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do today. Instead of simply deciding well-defined issues of
fact, early juries also interpreted and applied the law.”117
Thus through jury service, the local community
effectively impressed its mores and norms into the criminal
law.118
If jury service enabled the local community to affect the
law, it also allowed the law to affect the local community.
Jury service was of public importance, in part, because it
educated the populace. As stated in an article in the
Washington Law Reporter in 1884, the jury was “a public
school of the highest possible order for the training of
good citizens.”119 These words were part of a stream of
commentary on the value of jury service running from the
Founding era Letters From A Federal Farmer,120 to Alexis de
Tocqueville in the nineteenth century121 and, most recently, to
Akhil Amar.122
In addition, jury service was valued as “the democratic
branch of the judiciary power.”123 At the Founding, a widelyshared political principle was that “the people” should
participate directly in every branch of government. Indeed,
both Thomas Jefferson and John Mercer, an anti-Federalist
member of the Constitutional Convention, were of the view
that popular participation in the judicial branch was “more
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117. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851.
118. AMAR, supra note 116, at 122–23 (discussing the role of “normative
judgment” involved in jury service); Appleman, supra note 2, at 408–09 (saying
jury service enabled the local community effectively “to both create and control
. . . the substantive law”).
119. Perkins, supra note 33, at 25 n.33 (quoting Waiver of Juries in Criminal
Cases, 12 WASH. L. REP. 456, 458 (1884) (reprinting an article by W.R. in the
Chicago Legal News)).
120. AMAR, supra note 116, at 122 (quoting the Letters’ view that “[The
people’s] situation, as jurors and representatives, enables them to acquire
information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the society; and to
come forward, in turn, as the centinels and guardians of each other”).
121. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851 (“The jury is both the most effective
way of establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient way of teaching
them how to rule.” (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
276 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1835))).
122. AMAR, supra note 116, at 122 (“Through jury service, citizens would
learn their rights and duties, and actively participate in the governance of
society.”).
123. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 851 (quoting Essays by a Farmer (pt. 4),
MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
36, 38 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981)).
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necessary than representatives in the legislature.”124 It was
this sentiment that led Alexander Hamilton to famously say
that although the “friends and adversaries” of the
Constitution “concur . . . in the value they set upon the trial
by jury,” the friends “regard it as a valuable safeguard to
liberty,” while the adversaries “represent it as the very
palladium of free government.”125
Shaped by these precepts, nineteenth-century lawyers,
judges, and commentators articulated two legal theories to
explain why criminal defendants could not waive a jury trial.
These two theories were so much a part of nineteenth century
thinking about juries that Supreme Court Justices, in the
already quoted string of precedent on the no-waiver principle,
stated them casually as the relevant ground norms.126
One theory, known as the “public interest” or “public
rights” theory, simply affirmed that “in criminal cases . . .
there are more than personal interests involved[.] . . . [T]he
rights and interests of the public are also concerned. Hence,
the right of waiver is denied . . . .”127 As explained at greater
length by a federal appellate court judge:
The right to waive a right does not exist when the matter
concerns the public as well as the individual . . . . [A] trial
for crime . . . involves the liberty or life of the citizen. This
is a matter over which the accused has not dominion. The
state, the public, are concerned that neither shall be
affected save by due process of law.128
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B
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124. AMAR, supra note 116, at 121 (quoting Essays by a Farmer, supra note
123); id. at 121 (quoting from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789 voicing
the same sentiment). John Mercer is the likely author of the anonymously
published Essays by a Farmer. See Walter Nicgorski, The Anti-Federalists:
Collected and Interpreted, 46 REV. POL. 113, 116 (1984).
125. Mazzone, supra note 111, at 850 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at
467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 31, 82, 98.
127. JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 157 (1877).
128. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 91–92 (6th Cir. 1909); see also Cancemi
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 137 (1858) (“Criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs
. . . which affect the whole community, considered as a community, in its social
and aggregate capacity”) (internal quotations omitted); W. F. Elliott, Waiver of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 6 CRIM. L. MAG. 182, 182–83, 189–90
(1885) (saying, inter alia, “[t]he public as well as the individual have an interest
in every criminal trial”); Waiver of Juries, supra note 119, at 457 (reprinting
article from the Chicago Legal News) (jury is “a political institution . . . the
strict maintenance of which society . . . has an interest which far transcends the
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in importance that of the individual whose rights may come before it”).
129. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138.
130. Territory of Montana v. Ah Wah, 1 P. 732, 734 (Mont. 1881); see also
Territory of New Mexico v. Ortiz, 42 P. 87, 88 (N.M. 1895) (defendant “must be
given trial before a tribunal known to the law—one having the power to declare
his guilt”); Metzner v. State, 157 S.W. 69, 70 (Tenn. 1913) (saying trial by jury
“is a matter of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and cannot be
conferred by consent”); PROFFATT, supra note 127, at 155 (saying “the jury is a
part of the administration of law, as much inherent to the court as any part of
the tribunal” and “to dispense with a jury . . . was in reality constituting
another tribunal than that established by law”). In Low, the court said that
“[t]he jurisdiction of the court to pronounce a judgment or conviction for crime,
when there has been a plea of not guilty, rests upon verdict by a jury.” Low, 169
F. at 92.
131. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
133. Consider also how easily cases and commentators ran the two theories
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The other theory, known as the “jurisdiction” theory, asserted
that when a constitution, whether federal or state, declared a
jury trial right it established the jury as part of the frame of
government. As stated in the leading antebellum precedent,
“when issue is joined upon an indictment, the trial must be by
the tribunal and in the mode which the constitution and laws
provide, without any essential change. The public officer
prosecuting for the people has no authority to consent to
such a change, nor has the defendant.”129 A post-bellum case
rendered the thought even more simply when it said: the
defendant “has no power to consent to the creation of a new
tribunal, unknown to the law, to try his offense.”130 So did
Justice Harlan when, dissenting from the case that
established the petty offense exception, he insisted that,
“[u]nder the express words of [the] Constitution . . . [t]he
court and the jury, not separately, but together, constitute the
appointed tribunal which alone, under the law, can try the
question of crime, the commission of which by the accused is
put in issue by a plea of not guilty.”131 In other words, when
the Constitution declared in Article III that “the trial of all
crimes . . . shall be by jury,” 132 it ordained that the only
tribunal with lawful power to try a person accused of crime
had to be composed of an Article III judge and a common law
jury.
In truth, the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories
expressed correlative understandings of the federal and state
constitutions’ jury trial mandates.133 By either theory, jury
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trial was a right that governments could not deny and
defendants could not waive. Jury trial protected the people
as well as the defendant.
Like all theories, the “public rights” and “jurisdiction”
theories had weaknesses and inconsistencies. 134 Nevertheless, as is usual with widely-accepted theories, contemporaries thought the theories’ problems had sufficient
answers. For example, in establishing the no-waiver rule for
criminal trials, judges and commentators had to account for
the fact that civil juries could be waived.135 The response
stated in “public interest” theory terms was: civil suits involve
property rights that are solely the concern of the parties and
therefore properly under their dominion. 136 After the nowaiver rule was established, its proponents needed to explain
why some criminal trial rights, such as the rights of personal
presence, 137 confrontation, 138 and a speedy trial, 139 could be
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together. See, e.g., Low, 169 F. at 91–92; Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 31–32; Elliott,
supra note 128, at 189 (speaking of “where the matter is jurisdictional and
affects the public”).
134. THOMAS KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66–76 (3d ed.
1996) (discussing various theories in astronomy, chemistry, and physics);
Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 176
(2009) (discussing the phenomenon of people sticking to legal theories despite
their weaknesses).
135. Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. 275, 281–83 (1871) (upholding a statute
authorizing elective bench trials in civil suits and reviewing older precedents
allowing waiver of civil juries); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 243–45
(1819); Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 136 (1858) (discussing waiver of civil
jury).
136. Schick, 195 U.S. at 96 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing criminal
from civil jury waiver by saying that criminal trials involve “things of more
consequence to the public than property, the value of which is to be measured in
money”); Low, 169 F. at 92 (waiver of civil jury allowed because they “involve[]
only property rights . . . over which [the parties] have dominion”); Belt, 4 App.
D.C. at 32 (civil jury waivable because civil cases involve private rights);
Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 136; THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 181 (1868) (waiver of constitutional rights
are permissible when they are “designed for the protection solely of the property
rights of the person”); Waiver of Juries, supra note 119, at 456–58. Civil jury
waiver was also justified by history as it was permitted at common law.
Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 807 (1st Cir. 1908).
137. King, supra note 95, at 127–29 (discussing the judicial retreat on
protecting the defendant’s right to be present at his trial); Elliott, supra note
128, at 185–86.
138. See Elliott, supra note 128, at 186–88 (discussing waiver of
confrontation).
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waived while the jury itself could not. 140 Drawing from
jurisdiction theory, the response was that although
defendants could waive trial related rights that were “merely
. . . formal”141 or “incidental,”142 they could not waive any that
were “fundamental”143 or “essential.”144
Perhaps the most obvious inconsistency for both theories
was that any defendant effectively waived a jury trial by
pleading guilty.145 From the “public rights” theory came the
answer that along with the defendant’s admission “the
preliminary investigation of a grand jury . . . . is supposed to be a sufficient safeguard to the public interest.”146
Unsurprisingly, the “jurisdiction” theory reached the same
result by pointing out that, “When the accused pleads guilty
before a lawful tribunal he admits every material fact . . . and
there is no issue to be tried; no facts are to be found; no trial
occurs. After such a plea nothing remains to be done except
that the court shall pronounce judgment . . . .”147 As Justice
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139. Territory of New Mexico v. Ortiz, 42 P. 87, 88 (N.M. 1895)
(distinguishing speedy trial waiver from jury waiver because the latter affects
jurisdiction); Perkins, supra note 33, at 23 (mentioning waiver of “speedy trial
by asking for a continuance”).
140. See generally Perkins, supra note 33, at 23–24 (list of waivable trial
related rights).
141. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 32; see also Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137–38 (consent
permitted to “mere formal proceedings”).
142. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (waiver permitted
when trial-related right provides only an “incidental benefit” to the defendant);
see also Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 816 (1st Cir. 1908) (Aldrich, J.,
dissenting) (contrasting waiving the “incidental” with the “fundamental”).
143. Belt, 4 App. D.C. at 32; see also Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 92 (6th
Cir. 1909) (no waiver of “any matter which involves fundamentally the
jurisdiction of the court”); Dickinson, 159 F. at 816 (Aldrich, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that “fundamental” aspects of the jury right cannot be waived).
144. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138 (no “essential change”); see also Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 82 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (no change in any
“essential rule”); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 96).
145. It should be noted that guilty pleas were not so frequent in the
nineteenth century so the inconsistency was not as noted. Guilty pleas, and
awareness of the problem, dramatically increase in the twentieth century with
the rise of plea bargaining. See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 5–6; John H.
Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal
Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 120 (1992); Langbein, supra note
52, at 268–70.
146. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138.
147. Schick, 195 U.S. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also West v.
Gammon, 98 F. 426, 428–29 (6th Cir. 1899) (holding that guilty pleas do not
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Harlan concluded, if due to a guilty plea there is no trial,
there cannot be a violation of the Constitution’s requirement
that “the trial of a crime shall be by jury.”148
Legal theories never are airtight. Social, political and
cultural factors, along with the theories’ basic logic,
determine whether they are successful. In its consideration
of waiver of trial-related rights, jurisprudence has moved
beyond the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories, at
least as originally stated. 149 Nevertheless, throughout the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they were widely
accepted and are readily apparent in the case law and
treatises. Although in the last third of the nineteenth
century a few state courts and commentators began to
criticize and even reject them,150 in 1900, and up through the
1920s, 151 the “public interest” and “jurisdiction” theories
provided the standard grounding for the criminal defendant’s
inability to choose a bench trial when prosecuted for a serious
offense.
II. DISSENTING VOICES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
For late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century jurists,
the Constitution’s text, common law tradition, Supreme Court
precedent, and constitutional theory all clearly supported the
no-waiver understanding of Article III, Section 2’s jury trial
requirement. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Thompson v.
Utah152 in 1898 was taken as settling the question.153
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 62 Side B
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violate the jury trial mandate because it obviates the need for a jury trial); Note,
Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 21 HARV. L. REV., 212, 213 (1908).
148. Schick, 195 U.S. at 82.
149. See infra text accompanying note 292–302 (discussing the theories’
rejection); Appleman, supra note 2, at 446 (arguing for a revival of differently
configured public interest theory); King, supra note 95, at 725; Mazzone, supra
note 111, at 851.
150. See In re Staff, 23 N.W. 587 (Wis. 1885); State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349
(1878); infra notes 267–68.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 264–65.
152. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 343 (1898).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03 (discussing lower court
precedent after Thompson). The 1904 Supreme Court ruling that defendants
had no right to a jury trial when prosecuted for “petty” offenses, a decision
taken over Justice Harlan’s vigorous dissent, was not understood as
undercutting the no-waiver rule for “serious” crime. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 72.
English common law and colonial, early state and federal practice all recognized
the exception. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, passim.
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During the three decades following the Thompson
decision there were only two dissenting voices in the federal
judiciary. 154 One was Frederick Brown, who sat on the
District Court for the Territory of Alaska.155 Aware of the
difficulty of “procuring a jury of twelve . . . in isolated places,”
and thinking that defendants wished to avoid the consequent
delay, Judge Brown suggested enlarging the petty offense
exception to embrace all misdemeanors.156 Quoting Supreme
Court precedent which said “[t]he law is a progressive
science,”157 Brown argued that “[t]he determination of [a jury
waiver] case requires the exercise of ‘practical common sense,’
the ‘rule of reason,’ freed from the trammels of the old
common-law distinctions between the degrees of crimes as
characterized hundreds of years ago under vastly different
conditions.”158
The other dissenting voice was Edgar Aldrich, a district
court judge who wrote a long dissent while sitting on the
circuit court panel that decided Dickinson v. United States.159
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154. See 3 LESTER B. ORFIELD, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES 43–46 (2d ed. 1986); Orfield, supra note 69, at 61–63
(discussing the cases decided between Schick and Patton). I do not consider
Territory v. Soga decided by the Hawaiian Territory Court as contrary to my
claim because I read that case to have determined the offense a petty crime.
Territory v. Soga, 20 Haw. 71, 92–93 (1910) (saying the offense at bar was
neither a felony nor infamous). Nor do I consider Queenan v. Oklahoma as
departing from the rule of Thompson because that case involved a waiver of
juror qualifications. See Queenan v. Oklahoma, 190 U.S. 548, 551 (1903). Belt
v. United States does not conflict with my claim because, although Belt upheld
jury waiver for misdemeanors, it was decided before Thompson. See Belt v.
United States, 4 App. D.C. 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1894). Thompson implicitly
overruled Belt. See Thompson, 170 U.S. 343.
155. But see In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500 (D.C. Alaska 1916) (another Alaskan
territorial judge construing the petty offense exception narrowly). I derive
Judge Brown’s first name from Michael Schwaiger’s Salmon, Sage-Brush, and
Safaris: Alaska’s Territorial Judicial System and the Adventures of the Floating
Court.
Michael Schwaiger, Salmon, Sage-Brush, and Safaris: Alaska’s
Territorial Judicial System and the Adventures of the Floating Court, 1901–
1915, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 97, 98, 99 (2009). Although I am treating Judge
Brown as a member of the federal judiciary, the point should be made that he
was not an Article III judge and served at the pleasure of the President. Id. at
101 n.15.
156. Ex parte Dunlap, 5 Alaska 521, 523–26 (D. Alaska 1916).
157. Id. at 525 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898)).
158. Id. at 527.
159. Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 812–24 (1st Cir. 1908) (Aldrich,
J., dissenting).
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Dickinson involved an appeal from a three-month long trial of
two bank cashiers charged with misappropriating funds.160
During the trial two jurors were discharged, one for sickness
and the other because of a death in his family.161 Each time a
juror was dismissed, the defendants consented in writing
to the trial’s continuation.162 After his conviction on a
misdemeanor count for aiding and abetting the other cashier,
Dickinson demanded a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was not rendered “by a jury of twelve jurors, as
required by the Constitution.”163
Aldrich thought that the facts of Dickinson made
an especially “strong” case for allowing waiver.164 But he
defended the propriety of jury waiver more generally through
an analysis that, like Judge Brown’s, broke with the formalist
jurisprudence of his colleagues.165 Aldrich was attracted to
the progressive jurisprudence of “Mr. Justice Holmes,”
according to which “constitutional rights . . . are matters of
degree, and constitutional provisions are not to be pushed to a
logical extreme, but must be taken to permit the infliction
of some fractional and relatively small losses.”166 By this
balancing-of-interests approach to constitutional analysis:

04/16/2012 17:10:32

160. Id. at 801–02 (majority opinion); id. at 812 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 812 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 804 (majority opinion).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 813. Among the facts is the length of the trial, that the jury
started off properly composed, that the charge was a misdemeanor, and that the
defendant gave his explicit written consent.
165. See supra text accompanying note 103 (quoting the Dickinson majority).
Aldrich also broke with his colleagues’ historical assumptions. See Dickinson,
159 F. at 814–15 (questioning the no-waiver rule’s historical basis).
166. Dickinson, 159 F. at 813 (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Holmes’s remark).
167. Id.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B

The aim of the constitutional safeguards in question is a
full, fair, and public trial, and one which shall reasonably
and in all substantial ways safeguard the interests of the
state and the life and liberty of accused parties. Whether
the idea is expressed in words or not, as is done in some of
the bills of rights and constitutions, a free and fair trial
only means a trial as free and fair as the lot of humanity
will admit.167
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The dissenting views of Judges Brown and Aldrich may
have been prescient,168 but throughout the 1910s and 1920s
they had traction neither with their fellow judges, nor with
treatise writers whose specialty was federal criminal
procedure. Federal criminal procedure treatises published
during those decades agreed that “[o]ne accused of an
infamous crime or felony cannot waive a trial by jury . . . even
though the United States and the defendant consent
thereto.”169 No treatise noticed Judge Brown’s opinion and
the only treatise to mention Judge Aldrich’s dissent did so to
criticize it.170 Throughout the 1920s, the dominant opinion
remained as it had been in 1900: Article III mandated an
unwaivable requirement that “the trial of all crimes . . . be by
jury.”171
III. THE OVERTHROW OF ARTICLE III’S JURY TRIAL MANDATE
AND THE NO-WAIVER RULE IN 1930
A. The Patton Decision
From the Founding through the 1920s, constitutional
text, precedent, and history were thought to support the rule
that “in all but petty offenses jury trial was a constitutional
imperative.”172 Yet, in 1930, this 140-year-old understanding
was swept away in Patton v. United States.173 Patton involved
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168. See infra text accompanying notes 200–303 (discussing the no-waiver
rule’s demise).
169. 1 ELIJAH ZOLINE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 210 (1921);
see also ATWELL, supra note 2, at 79–80; JOHN BRYNE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 143 (1916). Atwell’s treatise had a first and second edition
published in 1911 and 1916 respectively that stated the same rule.
170. ATWELL, supra note 2, at 79–80. Atwell not only supported the nowaiver rule, he considered guilty pleas in felony cases a violation of the right to
jury trial. Id. at 26–27. Atwell’s strong support of jury trial was premised on
his view that “[n]o judge, however learned, no set of judges, however impartial
can approximate the justice that is found and dispensed by the layman juror.”
Id. at 78. Atwell’s praise, which might have been more typical in the nineteenth
century, was anachronistic in his day. By the 1920s, the institution of jury trial
was under substantial attack. See infra text accompanying notes 269–303.
171. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
172. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 32 (1965); see also Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 95–96 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 276 (1930). Patton came to the
Court as a certified question from the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 287. In the
certification opinion, the appellate judges did not claim there was any circuit
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a felony trial that lasted for seven days.174 On the sixth day a
juror was excused for “severe illness.”175 Rather than accept a
mistrial, both the prosecution and defense consented to
“waive all objections” and agreed to finish the trial with the
eleven remaining jurors.176 After their conviction, the
defendants appealed, arguing they “had no power to waive
their constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve
persons.”177
Thus the issue in Patton, if narrowly defined, was the
constitutionality of consent to continuing a trial that began
with a properly formed jury when a juror is excused for good
cause during the trial.178 When, a dozen years later, Patton
was extended to a case involving complete jury waiver
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented on the ground
that “there is a considerable practical difference between trial
by eleven jurors, the situation in Patton . . . and trial to the
court, and practicality is a sturdy guide to the preservation of
Constitutional guarantees.”179 The majority, however, treated

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 64 Side B
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conflict regarding the jury-waiver rule. Rather, the judges said they were “in
doubt as to the law” because of defendants’ abilities to waive other
constitutional rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, confrontation, and
assistance of counsel. Patton v. United States, 30 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir.
1929). That the Eighth Circuit could cite no conflicting case law indicates the
circuit was forcing the issue and suggests that the Supreme Court, in accepting
the question, may well have been reaching for it. Certification is generally a
disfavored procedure for presenting issues to the Supreme Court. See EUGENE
GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 9.1 at 597 (9th ed. 2007).
Patton arose during what was perhaps the only decade when it was somewhat
popular. Id. § 9.1, at 596–97 (giving statistics on certification petitions and
grants); James Moore & Allan Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 n.99 (1949).
174. Patton, 281 U.S. at 286. The charge, conspiracy to bribe a prohibition
agent, was the most minor grade of felony as it was punishable by one year in
prison. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 286–87. Thus, the case was similar to Dickinson v. United States.
See Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801, 801 (1st Cir. 1908) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 159–67, except that it involved a felony rather than a
misdemeanor).
177. Patton, 281 U.S. at 287.
178. Id. Appellate court precedent, albeit with a divided panel, permitted
such a trial to continue with a replacement juror. Grove v. United States, 3
F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1925). In Grove, the transcript of prior testimony was read to
the reconstituted jury, and the witnesses vouched to their former testimony.
The main issue was whether there was a confrontation clause violation. Id. at
965.
179. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 286 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
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Patton as decisive and brushed the dissenters’ view aside.180
Whatever the merits of Patton’s extension to complete
rather than partial jury waiver, Patton surely announced a
paradigm shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the
criminal jury-trial-waiver issue and contains its fullest
explication.181 Patton also is the watershed case for the
analysis of waiver of criminal trial-related rights in
general.182
Patton was written by Justice George Sutherland, a
conservative Justice who believed the Court’s proper role was
to discover, articulate, and apply the principles of AngloAmerican government that the Founding generation
embedded in the Constitution when they wrote and adopted
it. 183 Sutherland’s dissent in the depression-era mortgage
moratorium case, Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 184 is an iconic statement of judicial commitment
to an unchanging constitution.185 In that dissent, Justice
Sutherland insisted that “[a] provision of the Constitution . . .
does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different
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dissenting); see also id. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
180. Adams, 317 U.S. at 277–78.
181. The circuit courts immediately cited Patton as deciding the complete
waiver issue. See Ferracane v. United States, 47 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1931)
(“Since the Supreme Court decision in Patton . . . there is no longer any question
of the right to waive”). Adams came to the Supreme Court because it involved
the extreme situation of a jury waiver by a defendant who was not a lawyer and
who was representing himself. See Adams, 317 U.S. at 270–71. He had,
however, acted as a lawyer in various suits against the New York Stock
Exchange, Better Business Bureau, and others. Id. These facts might make
someone question the defendant’s mental stability rather than deem him legally
astute. Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in Adams succinctly
reiterates the “principle” of Patton and finds it decisive. Id. at 275.
182. See King, supra note 95, at 125–30 (shifts in doctrine regarding the
defendant’s right to jury waiver, presence, and limitations periods); Mazzone,
supra note 111, at 849–55 (using jury waiver to explain and date the shift to a
view that criminal-trial-related rights are “individualistic”).
183. G. Edward White, The “Constitutional Revolution” as a Crisis in
Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 884–99 (1997). White makes the point that
Justice Sutherland sought fidelity to the Constitution’s fixed “meta-principles.”
Id. at 891 n.109.
184. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
185. James Ely, Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 371, 390 (2010); Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62
VAND. L. REV. 639, 665–67 (2009); Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 706–07 (2005); White, supra note 183, at 884–86.
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thing at another time.”186 In his view:
The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of
the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people
who adopted it. The necessities which gave rise to the
provision, the controversies which preceded, as well as the
conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, are
matters to be considered to enable us to arrive at a correct
result. The history of the times, the state of things
existing when the provision was framed and adopted
should be looked to in order to ascertain the mischief and
the remedy. As nearly as possible we should place
ourselves in the condition of those who framed and
adopted it. And, if the meaning be at all doubtful, the
doubt should be resolved, wherever reasonably possible to
do so, in a way to forward the evident purpose with which
the provision was adopted.187

Justice Sutherland’s originalism did not preclude all
constitutional adaptation. Constitutional “provisions . . .
are pliable,” he believed, “in the sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bringing within
their grasp every new condition which falls with
their meaning.”188 Nonetheless, outside of an Article V
amendment,189 constitutional adaptivity was limited by the
Sutherland,
the
“meaning/application” dichotomy.190 For
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186. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also id. at
449–53 (quoting other Justices and leading treatise writers).
187. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 451.
Justice Sutherland’s most famous discussion of the
meaning/application distinction is the landmark case upholding the
constitutionality of zoning, where he said:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the
scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of
their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be
otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to
the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles,
statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new
conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of
course, must fall.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); see also White,
supra note 183, at 897–98 (explicating Justice Sutherland’s views on
constitutional change).
189. U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the process for amending the
Constitution’s text).
190. By the “meaning/application” dichotomy I mean Justice Sutherland’s
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contrast between the principles embedded in constitutional provisions, which
are fixed and unchanging, and outcome of their use in discrete cases, which may
change as the facts or societal context they govern changes. See White, supra
note 183, at 874–79, 884–86 (discussing the views of Justice Sutherland and
Solicitor-General James Beck).
191. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
192. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); see also id. at 289
(speaking of the “requisites” of jury trial).
193. Id. at 292; see also id. at 288–89 (quoting Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343 (1898), discussed supra text accompanying notes 83–98).
194. Id. at 292.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 290.
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Constitution’s “meaning is changeless; it is only [its]
application which is extensible.”191
Despite his jurisprudence, it was Justice Sutherland who
gave an entirely new meaning to Article III’s jury clause. His
Patton opinion illuminates how, even for a dedicated
opponent of a “living Constitution,” evolving principles of
constitutional policy may nevertheless alter the meaning of
concrete and determinate constitutional text.
Justice Sutherland’s Patton opinion began with a
reminder that was entirely consistent with common law
tradition and Supreme Court precedent: that the three
“essential elements” of a common law (and, therefore,
constitutional) jury trial were 1) twelve men, 2) supervised
and instructed by a judge, who 3) reach a unanimous
verdict.192 Also, consistent with precedent and its formalist
logic, Sutherland stated that if there is any variation in the
number of jurors “it ceases to be [a constitutional] jury.”193
Subtracting one juror or eleven jurors was different only in
the size of the “infraction”194 and “[i]t is not our province . . .
[to] ignore the violation, if, in our opinion, it is not, relatively,
as bad as it might have been.”195 Consistent with the views of
Justices throughout the nineteenth century, Sutherland
refused to separate the issue of partial from full waiver.
Although Patton involved a verdict rendered by an elevenperson jury, Sutherland addressed the case as necessarily
implicating the constitutionality of “complete waiver”
followed by a bench trial.196
In other words, in Patton, Justice Sutherland understood
the issue of a short jury exactly as Justices had throughout
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the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.197 He phrased
the “crucial inquiry” as they had: was “the effect of the
constitutional provisions in respect of trial by jury to
establish a tribunal as part of the frame of government, or
only to guarantee to the accused the right to such a trial?”198
Yet when Sutherland turned to analyze the issue, he
immediately took a novel tack. With quick strokes, he
dismissed all prior precedent on the subject as dicta, re-wrote
the common law tradition, turned the relation between
Article III’s and the Sixth Amendment’s jury provisions on its
head, and concluded that the Framers’ had overstated their
true intent in drafting Article III’s jury mandate.199
1. Sutherland’s Discussion of Prior Precedent
Justice Sutherland’s treatment of prior precedent began
by quoting the statement in Thompson v. Utah200 on which
Patton “strongly rel[ied]” 201 and which “if followed, would
require”202 that Patton get a new trial because he had no
power to consent to an eleven-person jury.203 That statement
was Justice Harlan’s claim in Thompson that “it was not in
the power of one accused of felony, by consent expressly given
or by his silence, to authorize a jury of only eight persons to
pass upon the question of his guilt.”204
Justice Harlan’s claim, which always had been taken as
the core meaning of the case,205 was dismissed by Justice
Sutherland as “an obiter dictum” because Thompson
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 66 Side B
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197. See infra text accompanying notes 99–103.
198. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930).
199. Id. at 293–98.
200. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 343 (1898).
201. Patton, 281 U.S. at 293.
202. Id. at 287.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 293 (quoting Thompson, 170 U.S. at 353); see also supra text
accompanying note 93 (quoting this part of Thompson).
205. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 31 F.2d 19, 21 (9th Cir. 1929) (citing
Thompson for the proposition that a twelve person jury cannot be waived);
Coates v. United States, 290 F. 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1923) (citing Thompson for
the proposition that jury trial is “mandatory” and “cannot be waived”); Blair v.
United States, 241 F. 217, 230 (9th Cir. 1917) (citing Thompson for proposition
that jury right “cannot . . . be waived”); Freeman v. United States, 227 F. 732,
750 (2d Cir. 1915) (describing Thompson’s holding). Justice Harlan certainly
meant what he wrote in Thompson. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 95
(1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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“involved the validity of a statute dispensing with the
common-law jury of twelve” and a defendant who “had been
silent only under constraint of the statute.”206 Thompson,
read in light of its facts, was not a ruling about “the effect of
an express consent.”207
Having swept Thompson aside as dictum, Justice
Sutherland turned to discussing two of the federal appellate
court precedents that, he acknowledged, had “definitively”
held defendant jury waivers unconstitutional. 208 One was
Low v. United States,209 which Sutherland said was “entitled
to great respect” because it was “rendered by Judge Lurton”
who later joined the Supreme Court. 210 But that was all
Sutherland said about Low before moving on to the other
case, Dickinson v. United States.211 He dwelt at length on
Dickinson; it was the longest sustained discussion of his
opinion. However, in discussing Dickinson, Sutherland spent
less than a sentence describing the case’s facts and holding
before launching into an extended set of quotations from
Judge Aldrich’s long-neglected dissent, which he approvingly
described as “scholarly and thoughtful.”212
The language Justice Sutherland quoted from Aldrich’s
dissent touched on a variety of points. It questioned the
common sense of banning jury waiver by pointing out that
defendants not only could waive most of their trial-related
rights, such as witness confrontation, compulsory process for
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 67 Side A
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206. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293 (1930). Justice Sutherland’s
assertion that Thompson “had been silent only under constraint of the statute,”
is not necessarily true. There is no evidence suggesting it. Thompson may just
as well have been strategically biding his time, hoping for an acquittal.
207. Id. It should be noted that Harlan thought his remarks were holding,
not dicta. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 84–85, 95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, in the 1920s, Sutherland’s view that the question of jury waiver as
open was not unique. See Frank Grinnell, To What Extent, If At All, Is the
Right to Jury Trial Optional in Criminal Cases in the Federal Courts?, 9 MASS.
L. QUART. (No. 4) 61, 61–62 (1924) (incorrectly saying there was no “direct
decision . . . on the point in the lower Federal courts”); S. Chesterfield
Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MICH. L. REV. 695,
720–21 n.66 (1927) (saying Thompson involved an “implied” waiver).
208. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294.
209. Low v. United States, 169 F. 86, 86 (6th Cir. 1909) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 30, 102).
210. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294.
211. Thompson, 159 F. at 801 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 159–
67).
212. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294–96.
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213. Id. at 294–95.
214. Id. at 296.
215. Id. at 294.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 183–91.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 304–20 (discussing Sutherland’s
public policy argument).
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obtaining witnesses, and assistance of counsel, but also could
obviate the whole trial by pleading guilty. 213 It repeated
Aldrich’s assertion that the English rule against waiver
originated in a desire to protect the rights of the defendant’s
family from the disinheriting effects of their kinsman’s felony
conviction.214 It also reminded the reader that the “aim” of
the Constitution’s jury trial provisions was a “trial as free and
fair as the lot of humanity will admit.”215
When written by Judge Aldrich, these comments were
expressly grounded in Justice Holmes’s progressive
constitutionalism and the conviction that constitutional
arrangements properly changed with the times.216 Since such
a view was anathema to Justice Sutherland,217 I suggest he
used them for a different reason. Placed as they were at the
end of Sutherland’s description of the relevant federal
precedents and just before the beginning of his own analysis
of the jury waiver issue, the purpose of the quoted language
was ground-clearing.
Like Aldrich, Sutherland thought
prohibiting jury waiver was illogical, anachronistic and bad
public policy,218 but the legal import of his policy views was
the implication that for those reasons a rational Framer or
ratifier would be unlikely to have constitutionalized the nowaiver rule.
This implication was critical to the success of Justice
Sutherland’s analysis as the argument he was about to make
affirming the constitutionality of jury waiver was
extraordinarily weak. Not all, but much of the persuasive
force of Sutherland’s argument came from his having
established at the outset that the no-waiver rule was
something a rational constitution-maker was unlikely to
adopt.
In essence, Sutherland’s description of federal
precedent, with its dismissal of Thompson and his emphasis
on Aldrich’s Dickinson dissent was a negative argument
focused on undermining the no-waiver position in order to set
it up for rejection on the most slender of grounds.
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2. Sutherland’s Discussion of Extra-Textual Evidence
Justice Sutherland knew, indeed, he openly “conceded” in
another part of the Patton opinion219 “that under the rule of
the common law the accused was not permitted to waive trial
by jury, as generally he was not permitted to waive any right
which was intended for his protection.”220 Nevertheless, in
his analysis of jury waiver’s constitutionality, Sutherland
never mentioned that the no-waiver rule was the traditional
common law rule. Instead he made two related assertions
that, like a common law rule, would be considered an extratextual proposition valuable for the light it shed on the
Founders’ understanding of the Constitution’s text.
Sutherland’s two assertions were: on the one hand, there was
no evidence from England, the colonies, or Founding-era
America that “trial by jury in criminal cases was regarded as
a part of the structure of government,”221 while, on the other
hand, there was evidence that jury trial “uniformly” was
regarded as a “privilege of the accused.”222
Justice Sutherland’s first assertion, even if it is taken
narrowly to mean direct statements literally describing “the
jury . . . as an integral and inseparable part of the court”223 is
something of an overstatement. 224 Nonetheless, given the
general absence of Founding-era discussion of jury waiver,
the assertion’s inaccuracy is minor and of no consequence for
this critique.225 Its importance for Sutherland was that it
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 68 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

219. Sutherland mentioned the common law rule as part of his discussion of
whether federal common law should allow jury waiver. See infra text
accompanying notes 314–17.
220. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) (discussing whether
jury waiver is against public policy).
221. Id. at 296; see also id. at 297 (making the connection to Founding-era
America). Throughout his analysis Sutherland uses the discourse of jurisdiction
theory as his marker for the no-waiver position. Id. at 296–98; supra text
accompanying notes 129–32 (saying jurisdiction theory includes the view that
the jury is part of the “structure of government”).
222. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.
223. Id. at 297.
224. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing Article III’s jury mandate); Note, supra note 26,
at 48–49 (discussing Hamilton’s and Madison’s views and Blackstone’s and
Richard Burn’s criticism of summary proceedings).
225. The hotly discussed issue for the Constitution-makers was the existence
of jury trial and the appurtenant rights that accompanied it. See infra text
accompanying notes 41–44.
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226. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296–98.
227. Id. at 296. Throughout his brief analysis Sutherland used the discourse
of jurisdiction theory as his marker for the no-waiver position. Id. at 296–98;
supra text accompanying notes 129–32 (saying jurisdiction theory includes the
view that the jury is part of the “structure of government”).
228. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297.
229. Id. at 297 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at *279).
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §
1779 (1833)) (emphasis in original) [Note: The passage Sutherland cites appears
originally in 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1773, at
652 (1833). Sutherland may have miscited it or have been working from a
different edition.]
232. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297 (quoting Blackstone and Story).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 298.
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stood in contrast and gave determinative weight to his second
assertion: that there was evidence that the Founding
generation thought of jury trial as a waivable privilege.226
Unfortunately, Sutherland’s second assertion is also
remarkably overstated if not entirely wrong.
The evidence Justice Sutherland proffered to support his
second assertion consists entirely of two short quotes to show
that at the Founding trial by jury was regarded as
a “privilege of the accused” and not “as a part of the
structure of government.”227 One quote, from Blackstone’s
Commentaries,228 was a description of trial by jury as “ ‘ the
glory of the English law,’ ” and “ ‘ the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy.’ ” 229 The other quote,
from Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, 230
stated, “[w]hen our more immediate ancestors removed to
America, they brought this great privilege with them, as their
birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable
common law which had fenced round and interposed barriers
on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.”231
Of course, these two quotes are entirely inadequate to
demonstrate Justice Sutherland’s proposition.
In these
snippets, Blackstone and Story describe jury trial not merely
as a “privilege,” but as a “great privilege,” “the most
transcendent privilege” and “the glory of English law.” 232
Although Sutherland acknowledges the modifiers,233 he hones
in solely on the word “privilege” to conclude that these two
leading commentators thought jury trial was something “the
accused . . . may forego at his election.”234
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235. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *379–80. Of course, the context of
Blackstone’s remarks was a discussion of compulsory, not elective, bench trials.
236. United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15–
204), discussed supra text accompanying notes 70–79.
237. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1305–06.
238. Patton, 281 U.S. at 296.
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However, it was not proper for Sutherland to ignore the
modifiers and encomiums that Blackstone and Story heaped
upon jury trial. The encomiums have some tendency to
indicate that Blackstone and Story thought of trial by jury as
having public as well as private importance. Moreover, if we
step back from the snippets themselves, we see that
Blackstone, for example, opposed nonjury trials even for petty
offenses because of their deleterious effect on the body politic
and corrupting influence on the judges themselves.235
The claim here is not that Blackstone thought of jury
trial as unwaivable.
It is an issue he never directly
addressed. Rather, the claim is that Sutherland places far
more weight on Blackstone’s use of the word “privilege” than
that slender reed can bear.
In contrast, Sutherland is entirely wrong in his use of
Story’s quote. No attempt to put Story’s prestige behind the
waivable privilege understanding of jury trial can possibly
succeed unless it contends with his famous disquisition
on jury trial in United States v. Gibert.236 As Sutherland
doubtlessly knew, in those remarks Story maintained that
jury trial was “imperative upon the courts,” that “prisoners
can be lawfully tried in no other manner,” and that “[t]he
constitution decides how [a defendant] shall be tried,
independent of any election on his part.”237 Story’s Gibert
opinion surely indicates that someone may describe jury trial
as a “privilege” yet think of it as a mandatory part of the
tribunal established to determine a defendant’s guilt or
innocence.
The quotes from Blackstone and Story are all the extratextual evidence Sutherland offered to show that the
Founding generation regarded jury trial as a waivable
“privilege of the accused” and not an unwaivable “part of the
structure of government.”238 In fact, there was little to no
discussion of jury waiver before or during the Founding era.
While jury trial was a subject of much discussion in the
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eighteenth century, with some of it occurring at the
Constitutional Convention and during the ratification
campaign, the topic of defendant’s waiver was not among the
subjects debated. Jury waiver simply was not an issue of the
day.
Silence is notoriously difficult for a historian to interpret.
Given the general inability of defendants to waive jury trial
in England, the colonies, and the early Republic, silence
should be taken as cutting in favor of the nowaiver position.239 Yet Sutherland felt justified in reaching
the opposite conclusion because, Blackstone’s and
Story’s descriptions of jury trial as a “valuable privilege”240
supposedly provided decisive evidence supporting the
personal privilege (and therefore, pro-waiver) interpretation
of Article III’s jury clause.
3. Sutherland’s Discussion of the Constitution’s Text

Id.
Id.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 297–98.
See supra text accompanying notes 32–40.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127 U.S. 540 (1888).

04/16/2012 17:10:32

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B

Justice Sutherland thought that his extra-textual
argument made it “reasonable to conclude that the Framers
of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the
accused.”241 Yet, turning to the Constitution’s text, he
claimed “[t]hat this was the purpose of the Third Article is
rendered highly probable by a consideration of the form of
expression used in the Sixth Amendment.”242
As previously discussed,243 at least since the last quarter
of the nineteenth century some reconciliation had always
been thought necessary between Article III’s peremptory
command that criminal trials “shall be by jury”244 and the
Sixth Amendment’s softer language which speaks of jury trial
as a “right” that “accused shall enjoy.”245 The authoritative
reconciliation, given by Justice Harlan in Callan v. Wilson,246
was that the Sixth Amendment fleshed out the details
of jury trial without compromising Article III’s
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247. See supra text accompanying notes 41–47.
248. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (citations omitted)
(quoting Callan, 127 U.S. at 549).
249. Id. at 298 (italics in the original).
250. Id. (drawing the interaction between Article III and the Sixth
Amendment the conclusion that “Article III . . . was meant to confer a right
upon the accused which he may forego at his election. To deny his power to do
so, is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement”).
251. Id. at 297.
252. Sutherland’s use of the Sixth Amendment for this purpose may be
regarded as violating a corollary of the “no conflict” principle that Sutherland
claimed to respect. The corollary was that the Sixth Amendment “is not to be
regarded as modifying or altering” Article III. Id. at 298. The art of
Sutherland’s argument was that he could claim he was using the Sixth
Amendment not to modify Article III, but to understand it.
253. Amar, supra note 46, at 1197–98.
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mandatory command.247 Sutherland saw the Article III/Sixth
Amendment relationship differently.
Quoting Harlan’s
determination that “[t]here is no necessary conflict” between
the Constitution’s two jury provisions,248 Sutherland said this
meant that “The first ten amendments and the original
Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should
be construed in pari materia. So construed, the latter
provision fairly may be regarded as reflecting the meaning of
the former.
In other words, the two provisions mean
substantially the same thing.”249 But what Sutherland meant
was that Article III took on the Sixth Amendment’s
permissive coloration.250
With regard to Article III, Section 2’s peremptory
language, Sutherland thought his extra-textual and textual
arguments combined to support the “reasonable inference”
that in writing Article III “the concern of the framers was to
make clear that the [defendant’s privilege] of jury trial should
remain inviolable,” and to achieve that important “end no
language was deemed too imperative.”251
In effect, Sutherland’s argument turned Harlan’s “no
conflict” principle on its head by reading the Sixth
Amendment as the dominant provision. Sutherland’s use of
the Sixth Amendment to understand what the Framer’s
meant by Article III’s jury trial clause supported
a substantial departure from that Article’s absolute textual mandate.252 While Harlan’s position was grounded in
well-known facts about the politics of the Founding era,253
Sutherland reached his conclusion without referring to a
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shred of evidence from the Founding era other than the text
of the Sixth Amendment and two short quotes from
Blackstone and Story.254 Sutherland’s argument that the “no
conflict” principle supported jury waiver was constructed
entirely from these sources and a “reasonable inference”
about why the Convention drafted Article III’s jury provision
with language that was more peremptory than it was meant
to be.255
Taken at face value, a unanimous Supreme Court in 1930
constitutionalized a criminal defendant’s ability, when
prosecuted for a serious offense, to waive trial by jury because
that is what the Founding generation meant when, in 1789, it
wrote “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury.”256 According to the Court, speaking through
Justice Sutherland, the Constitution’s text (the Sixth
Amendment) and context (Blackstone’s and Story’s calling
jury trial a “privilege”) pointed to the historically correct
constitutional rule, a rule that redrafted Article III’s jury
provision into something less than an absolute requirement
in order to reflect the Founding generation’s true
understanding. Sutherland’s startling conclusion was that
the Framers had misdrafted Article III’s jury provision,
overstating what they meant to say.
B. Accounting for the Patton Decision

04/16/2012 17:10:32

254. Patton, 281 U.S. at 297–98.
255. See supra text accompanying note 251 (quoting Sutherland). This is not
the only time that an investigation of the constitutional draftsmen’s true intent
has redrafted explicit constitutional text. The construction of the Twenty-First
Amendment’s second section may be another. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005); Laurence Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really
Trying, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 98, 99
(William Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
256. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
257. Amar, supra note 46, at 1197.
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Justice Sutherland’s opinion presents itself as a
historical excavation. He writes as if considerations of public
policy and evolving principles of constitutional law had
nothing to do with it. Yet, Akhil Amar is restrained when he
says, “None of the arguments in Patton v. United States
survives close scrutiny.” 257 There can be no doubt that
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Patton’s historical analysis is remarkably wrong.258
How do we account for Patton’s sudden break with a
century and a half of constitutional tradition that itself
reflected common law history, the Constitution’s text, and
Founding era practice? Patton may well be an instance of
result-driven jurisprudence, and, given Justice Sutherland’s
legal philosophy, a paradigmatic example of what Andrew
Koppelman has called “phony originalism.”259 Much of what
follows will seem to be driving to that conclusion, but in the
end, I suggest that Justice Sutherland, in the grip of
“motivated reasoning,” may well have believed his
implausible analysis.
My argument begins by describing the early-twentiethcentury changes in the administration of criminal justice and
related changes in social and legal thought that made the nowaiver rule an anachronistic and much criticized rule of
public policy. It then establishes Justice Sutherland’s full
agreement with his contemporaries’ criticism of the rule.
Next, my argument describes an emergent body of historical
scholarship that challenged the no-waiver rule’s claim to be
the Founding generation’s intended rule. It concludes by
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258. In addition to the shortcomings of Patton’s history, Patton may be
unfortunate as a matter of constitutional theory and constitutional policy. As a
matter of theory, there is a rising tide of criticism of Patton’s view of waiver of
trial-related rights generally. See Appleman, supra note 2; King, supra note 95;
Mazzone, supra note 111. In terms of policy, although I agree with Patton’s
outcome—that is, permitting jury waiver (under living, not original,
constitutional principles)—Patton contains dicta indicating that defendants
should not be able to insist on one. In a development that can only be termed
farcical, Sutherland concluded his Patton opinion with a paean to jury trial as
“the normal . . . and preferable mode” of trial and a “right” that “must be
jealously preserved,” by which he meant, in part, that “before any waiver can
become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the
court must be had.” Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. Due to these dicta, ever since
Patton, a defendant who wants a bench trial needs to secure permission from
his prosecutor. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965); Fred
DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of
the “Prosecutorial Veto,” 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091 (1983); Adam Kurland,
Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant With a Unilateral Right to a Bench
Trial, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1993); Note, Inability to Waive Jury Trial in
the Federal Courts, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 722 (1965). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure codifies this understanding. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
259. Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 749 (2009) (defining “phony originalism” as an
“originalism . . . which is opportunistically used to advance substantive
positions that the judge[] finds congenial”).
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establishing that Justice Sutherland agreed with this new
historical scholarship and argues that given the new history,
Justice Sutherland could have ruled as he did and still felt he
had complied with his originalist jurisprudential norms.
As a preliminary matter, it may be noted that Patton’s
arguments and analysis should be understood as expressing
the thinking of Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds and
Van Devanter, who together composed the Court’s
conservative wing.260 Though the Patton decision was
unanimous and there was no other opinion, Justices
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone are noted as concurring in the
result only.261 Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Patton is a
statement wholly reflecting his jurisprudence and the
jurisprudence of his conservative colleagues, who presumably
were equally originalist. In Patton, Sutherland’s analysis
was unqualified by the need to attract the votes of Justices
who might decide cases according to the norms of a “living
Constitution.”262
Nonetheless, despite Sutherland’s originalist jurisprudence, Patton clearly reflects evolving principles of
constitutional law. Although constituting the jury as a
necessary and unwaivable part of a criminal trial was the
preferred public policy at the Founding, permitting jury
waivers undoubtedly was the favored policy of the third
decade of the twentieth century.
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B
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260. It is possible that the Patton opinion expressed only Sutherland’s views,
as the modern practice of circulating opinions before their issuance was
“informal and occasional before 1947.” See G. Edward White, The Internal
Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1463, 1505 (2006).
261. Patton, 281 U.S. at 313. Chief Justice Hughes, the Court’s remaining
progressive, joined the Court after Patton’s argument and did not participate in
the decision. Id. Justice Sanford, who died a week and a half after Patton’s
argument was reported as agreeing with “a disposition of the case in accordance
with [the] opinion.” Sutherland’s opinion, released a month and a half later, did
not have to reflect his views.
262. It is unfortunate that none of the concurring Justices chose to write out
the rationale for their vote. It might have made an intriguing contrast to
Sutherland’s opinion.
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1. Docket Overload and the Critique of Jury Trial in the
1920s
From the Founding through the Civil War, jury trial was
required in the prosecution of serious crime in all states
except Maryland.263 By the turn of the twentieth century,
only three more states had departed from that rule.264 As late
as the 1920s, “the only alternative to a guilty plea in most
states was a jury trial.”265 It was between 1925 and 1935 that
the majority of the states reversed course and began to
allow jury waiver in prosecution for serious crime.266 The
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263. See Appleman, supra note 2, at 421–26, 439–40; Hon. Carroll T. Bond,
The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone, Without
Juries, 11 A.B.A. J. 699, 700–01 (1925); Griswold, supra note 54, at 667–69;
King, supra note 95, at 125–26; Towne, supra note 61, at 149–52. Bruce Smith’s
demonstration that in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century New York
bench trials were allowed for a wide variety of significant crime indicates that
the boundary between “petty” and “serious” crime was not settled and
encompassed more important crimes than the modern conception. Smith’s work
should not be understood as suggesting that there was no requirement for jury
trial for serious crimes. See Bruce P. Smith, A New Verdict on Criminal Jury
Trial in Antebellum America (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author) (studying New York’s increasing insistence on the norm and narrowing
conception of the petty crime exception). Smith’s work suggests that at midcentury the no-waiver norm was more stringently conceived and enforced than
it was at the Founding. This conclusion regarding the growth of the norm is
also supported by the fact that most forthright and forceful nineteenth-century
precedents on the jury trial requirement date from the 1840s and 1850s. See,
e.g., Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 134–39 (1858); Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498,
500 (1847).
264. DAVID BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 85–86 (1992); Towne, supra note 61, at 152, 157–59
(mentioning Maryland, Connecticut, Indiana, and Louisiana). Towne says “at
least” four states departed from the rule in the late-nineteenth century, but I
have found no more than four. See Annotation, Right to Waive Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases, 48 A.L.R. 767, 767–69, 772–75 (1927) (comprehensive listing of
cases).
265. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 33 (emphasis supplied); see also Abraham
Goldberg, Waiver of Jury in Felony Trials, 28 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164 (1929) (a
1929 law review article listing only seven states that permit felony bench
trials).
266. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 33 (saying jury waiver was “almost
universally” adopted by 1935); King, supra note 95, at 127 (dating the general
acceptance of jury waiver to the mid-1920s); Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 703
(upholding waiver is “a distinct tendency . . . in more recent years”); Recent
Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064 (1930) (saying that permitting jury waiver was
“[t]he trend of recent cases”). By 1947, all but seventeen states permitted bench
trials in at least some felony cases. William Handley, Jr., Some Observations on
Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 Tex. L. & Leg. 45, 54 (1947). A 1993
study found that only North Carolina still prohibited jury waiver in felony
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movement to permitting jury waiver was a societal
phenomenon.
The abrupt switch in state constitutional law—which
was reflected, complemented and spurred on by the
Patton decision—was decades in the making.267 Rather than
resulting from anything new, it was like a dam bursting
under the accumulating pressures of social, political,
philosophical, and jurisprudential change. Opinion favoring
the jury trial requirement had begun to shift in the last third
of the nineteenth century.268 By the 1910s and 1920s, public
and professional disenchantment with jury trial had reached
flood tide.269 In those years, according to one contemporary
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trials. Kurland, supra note 258, at 323. A few more states refuse to allow it in
capital cases. Id. at 322.
267. See James A. C. Grant, Felony Trials Without a Jury, 25 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 980, 980–84 (1931) (discussing juryless trials in the states); Grant, supra
note 34, at 135–41 (same); Perkins, supra note 33, at 49 (describing Patton as
“the culmination of three-quarters of a century of judicial thought” and saying
“its influence [in the states] has already assumed significant proportions”). At
the time of the Patton decision, about fifteen states permitted jury waiver in at
least some felony cases, twenty-four forbade it, and the law in nine states was
unclear. Grant, supra note 34, at 146. In England, the movement to permit
bench trials for serious offenses began somewhat earlier with the Juvenile
Offenders Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., c. 82 and was completed with the Criminal
Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, just about when America made its
transition. Handley, supra note 266, at 45–46; Pendleton Howard, The Rise of
Summary Jurisdiction in English Criminal Law Administration, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 486, 491–97 (1931). In 2004, England began to go further and abolished
jury trial entirely for several classes of serious crime. Peter Thornton, Q.C.,
Trial by Jury: 50 Years of Change, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 119, 119 & n.7 (2004).
268. The movement away from the no-waiver rule is evidenced by the fact
that in the last third of the nineteenth century three states joined Maryland in
permitting nonjury trials. See supra text accompanying note 264. It is also
evidenced by the increasing disaffection with the twelve-person jury
requirement. Towne, supra note 61, at 152–57; see also 1 JOEL BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 543–44 (2d ed. 1872)
(leading treatise writer expressing support for defendant’s jury waiver when
“expressly authorized by statute”); STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 224–28 (1889) (reviewing but disagreeing with recent cases
allowing waiver); Elliott, supra note 128, at 183–85 (commentator giving only
equivocal support to the no-waiver and twelve-person jury rules).
269. Consider the following sampling of articles written in the 1920s cited in
Rollin Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases (pt. 2), 16 IOWA L.
REV. 223, 223 nn.130–31 (1931): Editorials, Shall the Jury System be Abolished,
35 W. VA. L.Q. 277 (1929); Bruce Sebille, Trial by Jury an Ineffective Survival,
59 AM. L. REV. 65 (1925); J. C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 57 AM. L. REV. 42
(1923). See also Grant, Felony, supra note 267 (a study of nonjury trials that
commends them). For additional scholarly criticisms of the jury, accompanied
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commentator, “forward looking members of the Bar and of the
laity” were so discontented with jury trial that they
propounded suggestions that ran “from the one extreme of
modification . . . to that of complete abolition.”270
The primary cause of the avalanche of discontent with
jury trial was that urbanization and industrialization, the
rise of regulatory government,271 the advent of state and
national prohibition,272 and a manifold increase both the
crime rate273 and in the number of legislatively defined
criminal offenses274 had dramatically increased the criminal
caseload up to and beyond the point of docket overload.275
Court congestion meant delay that not only provoked public
disrespect for the criminal justice system276 but also harmed
unbailed defendants who languished in lengthy pre-trial
detention.277 Docket overload set off a search for reforms
aimed at “mak[ing] criminal procedure more adaptable to the
prompt dispatch of business.”278
In this context, proponents of abandoning the no-waiver
rule for serious criminal offenses pitched their suggestion as a
moderate and practical reform that effectively streamlined
the criminal process.279 Bench trials, they said, reduced court
congestion by permitting less complex and drawn out trial
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by suggestions of reform, see Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 916–22;
Oppenheim, supra note 207. Perkins traces disenchantment with jury trial
among legal scholars to the early 1900s. Perkins, supra, at 223 n.131 (citing,
inter alia, Alfred Coxe, The Trials of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286 (1901);
Edson Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302
(1915); G.H. Williams, Abolition of the Jury System, 20 N.J. L.J. 50 (1906)). I
have found earlier expressions of dissatisfaction. See supra note 268 (citing
BISHOP, supra note 268, and Elliott, supra note 128).
270. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 163.
271. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 976.
272. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32.
273. Handley, supra note 266, at 45.
274. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32.
275. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 52, at 32; Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra
note 10, at 920, 976.
276. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 695.
277. Grant, supra note 267, at 992; Perkins, supra note 269, at 224.
278. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 695–96.
279. BODENHAMER, supra note 264, at 85; Oppenheim, supra note 207, at
695–96 (general claim of bench trial’s greater efficiency); Petty Offense Category,
supra note 6, at 1304 (“[E]xperience . . . goes far to justify [jury waiver] . . . at
least on the ground of administrative expedience.”).
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280. Grant, supra note 267, at 993.
281. Perkins, supra note 269, at 225.
282. Grant, supra note 267, at 993.
283. Id.; Perkins, supra note 269, at 225. Reducing expenses was especially
appreciated with the advent of the Great Depression.
284. Grant, supra note 267, at 993; see also Oppenheim, supra note 207, at
714–15 (commenting on the judiciary’s “greater experience” and “integrity”).
285. Grant, supra note 267, at 993; Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696, 714;
Perkins, supra note 269, at 225; see also Handley, supra note 266, at 50–51
(later commentator making the same point). During the McCarthy era, scholars
argued that criminal defendants should have a unilateral right to insist on a
bench trial to avoid community prejudice. See Kurland, supra note 258, at 313
n.13.
286. Perkins, supra note 269, at 224 (speaking of jury trials).
287. Grant, supra note 267, at 994; Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2
S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 127 (1928); Perkins, supra note 269, at 225–26.
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processes280 and by necessitating a “smaller number of new
trials, appeals and reversals”281 due to their “greater security
against error.”282
Reduced court congestion was only one of a wide variety
of benefits that early twentieth-century commentators
expected to follow from permitting defendants to opt for a
bench trial. As a more expeditious and less error-prone
process, commentators said bench trials would reduce
government budgets by reducing the financial cost of trial
practice.283 Commentators also commended bench trials for
their greater accuracy, due to their belief that factual
determinations would be made by a judge’s “keen, critical,
and trained mind.”284 This reform was especially important
in cases where sensational newspaper reporting, the
defendant’s prior record, or the racial or sexual nature of the
offense had stirred up community prejudice.285 Not only were
defendants thought to welcome the option of bench trial in
such cases, but it was said that in every case, whether the
defendant elected bench or jury trial, he was more likely to
appreciate the trial process because it was chosen rather than
imposed.286
Legal commentators also recommended optional bench
trials as a desirable means to stave off another recently
arisen technique for avoiding the delay, expense, and hazard
of mandatory jury trial: the plea bargain.287 Historians of
plea bargaining agree that the same years that witnessed the
demise of the no-waiver rule also witnessed the rise of plea

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 74 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC

2012]

3/14/2012 2:57:38 PM

THE CONSTITUTION ON TRIAL

425

04/16/2012 17:10:32

288. See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 24–33; King, supra note 95, at 125–27.
289. Alschuler, supra note 52, at 6, 24–33; Albert Alschuler & Andrew Deiss,
A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
867, 924–25 (1994); King, supra note 95, at 125–27; Langbein, supra note 52, at
270 (linking plea bargaining with the slow emergence of, and judicial prejudice
against, jury waiver); Mazzone, supra note 111, at 853–54 (linking attitudes
towards plea bargaining and jury waiver).
290. Perkins, supra note 269, at 225–26; see also BODENHAMER, supra note
264, at 86–87 (discussing opposition to plea bargaining and its slow acceptance);
Grant, Felony, supra note 267, at 994–95; Mazzone, supra note 111, at 852–54
(a contemporary analysis of the connection between plea bargaining and jury
waiver); Moley, supra note 287, at 127.
291. Perkins, supra note 269, at 224.
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bargaining.288 The growth and grudging acceptance of plea
bargaining was a response to the same pressures that
promoted the desire for jury waiver.289 Immersed in a society
that was just emerging from regarding with alarm any jury
trial avoidance technique other than a freely given guilty
plea, some commentators recommended the option of bench
trial for the “decided reduction in the growing practice of
‘bargaining for pleas.’ ” 290
The final practical reason advanced in support of
departing from the no-waiver rule reflected class and ethnic
prejudice of the governing elite.
Urbanization and
immigration from a diverse array of countries meant that
jury panels were likely to be populated by an ethnically
diverse group of laborers. As one commentator wrote, “A
substantial reduction in the call for jury service might make
it possible to improve very materially the quality of jurors
chosen.”291
Beyond the practical reasons, commentators in the 1920s
argued for overturning the no-waiver rule on theoretical
grounds. It is startling how completely the critical
commentary published in the 1920s turned the prior analysis
on its head to find sufficient the very arguments that before
had been found insufficient. Now, for example, the ability of
defendants to plead guilty was taken to completely undercut
the no-waiver rule’s pretensions. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim,
for example, before elaborating a variety of circumstances
that might influence “innocent persons” to enter a plea of
guilty, dismissed the claim that guilty pleas were different
from jury waivers simply by asking rhetorically:
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If the public have an interest in the liberties of the
individual to the extent of making a jury trial mandatory,
is that interest less important when the accused elects to
avoid any trial? Should the exercise of his will be ignored
in the one case and respected in the other?292

04/16/2012 17:10:32

292. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 716; see also Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 305–06 (1930); Brief for the United States at 27, Patton, 281 U.S. at
276 (No. 53).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
294. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 26.
295. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 713.
296. Id. at 712–13.
297. Id. at 713.
298. On the shift from formalism to sociological jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM (1949); Julius Stone, Roscoe Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence,
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The ability of defendants to waive so many other trial related
rights, which before was explained by distinguishing between
fundamental and incidental rights,293 now was seen as
problematic. The dichotomization of rights into separate
categories suddenly was less important than the fact that the
Constitution referred to them all as rights. Therefore, the
newly preferred argument was that “there is no reason why
the right to trial by jury should be regarded as standing upon
any different footing than other rights conferred by the Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, which have been held to be
waivable.”294
Even the very notion of a public interest separate from
the sum of private interests came to be doubted. Jury waiver
was reconceived as a question of public policy addressing
whether “the welfare of the individual and the state demand
a mandatory jury trial.”295 The answer to such a question, it
was said, “depends upon a balancing of all [relevant]
factors,”296 an activity which typically was more suited for
legislatures than courts. Accordingly, “[t]he courts should be
hesitant to invade the domain of [the legislature] by reading
their predilections into the constitutional limitations
governing the jury and thus to substitute their judgment for
the judgment of the legislature concerning a function that is
best expressed by enactment.”297
At bottom, the theoretical attack expressed a shift in the
jurisprudential commitments of scholarly commentators from
formalism to realism and sociological jurisprudence.298 More
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78 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1965).
299. See DANIEL HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY 8–9, 170–71 (2007)
(discussing the post-Civil War triumph of liberalism over republicanism).
300. The shift regarding jury waiver was part of a general shift in the
conceptualization of the Constitution’s procedural rights from “public good” to
“privilege of an individual.” King, supra note 95, at 120.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22.
302. Perkins, supra note 33, at 25 n.33. The “citizen training” rationale is
discussed supra text accompanying notes 119–22.
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generally, the theoretical argument against the traditional
no-waiver rule reflected liberal individualism’s final
triumph as the dominant national creed.299 This creedal shift
encouraged judges and commentators to interpret
constitutional rights as individual privileges rather than
collective rights.300 Indeed, in one illustrative aside, Rollin
Perkins, whose critical analysis was more even-handed than
most because it discussed strengths and weaknesses on both
sides, could not help but demean the “citizen-training” branch
of the old public interest theory301 by dismissing it with the
wry comment that it was “[p]erhaps the most unique
suggestion along these lines.”302
Due to this creedal shift, the intellectual apparatus
required to understand the traditional theoretical support for
the no-waiver rule had vanished. One looks in vain through
the critical literature of the 1920s for any notion that the
“public interest” is something other than the sum of private
interests. Indeed, the absence of any discussion of the “public
interest” is among the most telling pieces of evidence of
demonstrating the connection between the rise of liberal
individualism and the demise of the no-waiver rule. The
commentators in the 1920s lacked the intellectual framework
to conceive the traditional and formerly dominant public
interest theory as it had been—as a right protecting and
valorizing the public’s participation in the administration of
criminal justice.
Of course, the intellectual shift was not, all by itself,
sufficient to undermine the theoretical foundations of the nowaiver rule. It worked in tandem with a host of social,
professional, political, and experiential changes. In the lateeighteenth century, it is inconceivable that the following
argument against the no-waiver rule would have been
considered persuasive by much of the population:
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Confidence in fairer treatment by the judge, based upon
the high quality and integrity of the personnel of the
judiciary, or the conviction that the greater responsibility
of the judgeship and the greater dignity and permanence
of the bench as compared with the fleeting character and
irresponsibility of the jury will conduce to a more
conscientious consideration of the case on its merits.
Attitude of counsel may influence a choice made upon this
ground.303

In the 1920s, however, it was unanswerable.
2. Sutherland’s Agreement with the 1920s’ Critique of
the No-Waiver Rule

04/16/2012 17:10:32

303. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 714–15.
304. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 294–96, 303–06, 307–09 (1930);
supra text accompanying notes 212–18 (discussing Judge Aldrich’s dissent). At
times, Justice Sutherland expressed his agreement with the quoted passages
sentiments. Id. at 307. At other times he just said they were “thoughtful.” Id.
at 294–95.
305. Patton, 281 U.S. at 294, 298–301, 305–07.
306. Id. at 307 (quoting Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910)).
307. Id.
308. Id. (quoting Hack, 124 N.W. at 494).
309. Id.
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Justice Sutherland fully agreed with his contemporaries’
critique of the traditional no-waiver rule.
Like his
contemporaries, he was a strong proponent of permitting
bench trials. Large sections of Sutherland’s Patton opinion
are occupied by lengthy quotes of other judges’ criticisms of the no-waiver rule, expressly adopting some
and implicitly adopting others as his own.304 In addition, at
times Sutherland spoke for himself.305 On these occasions,
Sutherland pointed to the differences between the common
law and modern criminal trial to show that although the nowaiver rule may have been appropriate in the past, it now
was anachronistic. At common law, even though a guilty
verdict frequently meant a death sentence,306 forfeiture of all
inheritable property,307 or some other punishment “out
of all proportion to the gravity of [the] crime,”308 common law
procedural rules barred the accused from such basic
protections as testifying on his own behalf or having a
lawyer.309 In light of the panoply of rights that surround the
modern trial process, Sutherland said, “the rule of the
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common law . . . was justified by conditions which no longer
exist,”310 and “with their disappearance justification for the
old rule no longer rests on a substantial basis.”311
Sutherland also pointed to the defendant’s power to
“plead guilty and thus dispense with a trial altogether”312 as
completely undercutting the no-waiver rule’s pretensions to
be sensible public policy or theoretically coherent.
In
Sutherland’s view,
[I]f the state may interpose the claim of public interest
between the accused and his desire to waive a jury trial, a
fortiori it should be able to interpose a like claim between
him and his determination to avoid any form of trial by
admitting his guilt . . . . [P]ublic policy is not so
inconsistent as to permit the accused to dispense with
every form of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to
dispense with a particular form of trial by consent.313

04/16/2012 17:10:32

310. Id. at 306; see also id. at 307.
311. Id. at 307.
312. Id. at 305.
313. Id. at 305–06. Sutherland also thought the defendant’s power to waive
his other Sixth Amendment rights raised substantial questions about why he
could not also waive a jury altogether. Id. at 294–95 (quoting Judge Aldrich).
314. See Grant, supra note 34, at 156 (saying that Congress should adopt a
statute on the subject). All Justice Sutherland claimed in Patton was that there
was no statute “requiring jury trial.” Patton, 281 U.S. at 299.
315. Patton, 281 U.S. at 302–13.
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Sutherland’s remarks negatively assessing the no-waiver
rule on public policy and legal-theoretic grounds were not
casual asides. In Patton, the Court permitted jury waiver on
its own authority because there was no congressional statute
authorizing it.314 Therefore, in Patton, after finding that
Article III permitted jury waiver, Sutherland was required to
go on and decide whether federal common law also permitted
it.315 Due to Patton’s legal context, Sutherland’s extended
remarks on the no-waiver rule’s policy and theory were as
central to the case’s ultimate outcome as his ruling on
whether Article III permitted jury waiver.
It was in this latter part of the opinion that Sutherland
discussed jury waiver from the standpoint of public policy and
legal theory. It was also in this discussion that Sutherland
flatly “conceded . . . that under the rule of the common law
the accused was not permitted to waive trial by jury, as
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generally he was not permitted to waive any right which was
intended for his protection.”316 In light of the traditional rule,
it was essential to Patton’s outcome that Sutherland’s
common law jurisprudence permitted judicial evolution of the
law. Sutherland thought judicial evolution of the common
law had to be legitimate because, on the one hand, the
common law was based on the judiciary’s understanding of
good public policy while, on the other hand, “[t]he public
policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions,
be the public policy of another.”317
To Sutherland, the propriety of judicial changes in the
common law followed from the fundamental precept that
similar, but only similar, cases should be treated the same. If
the conditions that justified applying a certain rule to a case
changed, continuing to apply the rule would be treating
dissimilar cases the same.318 Observing that conditions no
longer supported the no-waiver rule,319 Sutherland concluded
that it was entirely “contrary to the spirit of the common law
itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason to a case
where that reason utterly fails—cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex.”320
In sum, it cannot be doubted that Sutherland agreed with
his contemporaries that modern public policy and legal theory
supported jury waiver and bench trial rather than the
traditional no-waiver rule.
Sutherland, of course, was quite aware that he viewed
the propriety of common law evolution differently from and
the propriety of constitutional evolution. Indeed, he included
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316. Id. at 306.
317. Id.
318. I see this as implicit in Sutherland’s remarks leading up to his quotation
from the Reno Smelting Works case. See id. (quoting Reno Smelting Works v.
Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 320 (Nev. 1889)).
319. Id. at 308.
320. Id. at 306 (quoting Reno Smelting Works, 21 P. at 320) (italics in
original). Sutherland’s discussion, in Patton, of common law evolution has
become a leading precedent justifying a large number of judicial reforms of
federal criminal procedure rules when they are based on common law rather
than constitutional or statutory grounds. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371, 381 (1933); United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 983 (9th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1952).
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321. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 184–91, 317–20.
323. The policy- and history-based attacks on the no-waiver rule were
interconnected, at least as a matter of the sociology of the profession. Frank
Grinnell, for example, who was a central mover in the development of the “new
history” was a strong supporter of jury waiver and clearly developed the
historical critique to further its chances for success.
See infra text
accompanying note 333.
324. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696.
325. See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 17–20; supra text accompanying notes
53–55.
326. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696.
327. Id. at 697.
328. Id. at 696 n.3 (quoting James Thayer).
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in his discussion of the federal common law a reminder that
his analysis would be different if the no-waiver rested on
either “constitutional or statutory provisions.”321 According to
Sutherland’s jurisprudence, judges might create and change
the common law, but they only applied and should never
change the law as determined by legislatures or the sovereign
people.322
Therefore, Sutherland’s rejection of the no-waiver rule’s
policy and theoretical supports should not have been enough
to lead him to reject it as the constitutionally required rule.
For Sutherland to reject the no-waiver rule, something else
was needed. And there was something else: In the 1920s,
along with the wholesale rejection of the policy and
theoretical support of the no-waiver rule, there emerged a
body of historical scholarship that questioned the no-waiver
rule’s claim to be the rule intended by the Founding
generation.323
This emergent body of scholarship assailed the historical
bonafides of the no-waiver rule through two different lines of
attack. One line focused on the well-known fact that jury
trial was never the “exclusive mode of determining the fate of
the accused” at common law.324 As discussed above, besides
jury trial, defendants might choose trial by battle or refuse to
plead and be crushed to death.325 To the historically-minded
critics of the no-waiver rule, this meant that “in theory . . .
jury trial . . . was volitional” 326 and it “was in principle
founded upon a choice.”327 The turn to criminal juries, they
said, “came . . . gradually, and by way of the consent of the
accused, willing or forced.”328 The import for the twentieth
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century of this line of argument was, “There is nothing
strange or new . . . in the idea that the defendant should
choose the method of trial which he prefers. On the contrary,
the theory of a choice was part of the origin of the
institution.”329
The other line of historical critique focused on jury trial
practice in the American colonies. Historians had always
taught that although the colonists based their legal system on
“the mother country” they did this with “some variations.”330
In the 1920s, drawing on recently published archival
material, Frank Washburn Grinnell asserted that a
defendant’s jury-trial waiver was among the variations in
Massachusetts.331 Judge Carroll Taney Bond did the same for
Maryland.332
Grinnell was a leader of the Massachusetts Bar in the
first half of the twentieth century with a strong interest in
both law reform and legal history.333 In addition to other
forms of professional service, he helped found the
Massachusetts Judicial Council, and was, for forty-five years,
the Editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly. As the
Quarterly’s Editor, Grinnell invited Judge Bond, who was a
prominent, history-minded Baltimore judge, to write an
article describing Maryland’s unique experience with bench
trials.334 Bond’s article caught the profession’s attention and
was republished in expanded form four years later in the
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 77 Side B
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329. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 17.
330. Id. at 20.
331. See id.; Grinnell, supra note 207, at 66–67; Frank Grinnell, Election of
Jury Trial in Criminal Cases in Colonial Massachusetts, 8 MASS. L. QUART. (No.
2) 106 (1922); infra text accompanying notes 341–66 (discussing Grinnell’s
research).
332. Bond, supra note 263; Carroll T. Bond, The Maryland Practice of
Allowing Defendants in Criminal Cases to Choose a Trial Before a Judge or a
Jury Trial, 6 MASS. L. QUART. (No. 4) 89 (1921). Carroll Bond is discussed infra
note 334.
333. For the remarks in this paragraph on Grinnell, see RICHARD HALE, JR.
& FRANK WASHBURN GRINNELL, 76 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 3RD SERIES, 154 (1964); Obituary, Frank W. Grinnell,
1873–1964, 50 A.B.A. J. 587 (1964).
334. In 1924, Bond was promoted from the Baltimore court to the Maryland
Court of Appeals and became its Chief Judge. He served in that capacity for
twenty years until his death in 1944. Bond’s interest in history is illustrated by
his book, CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY
(1928). On Grinnell’s invitation see Bond, Allowing Defendants, supra note 332,
at 89.
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Journal of the American Bar Association. Bond traced
nonjury trial in colonial Maryland back to 1693.335 According
to Bond, nonjury trial had “become a common method of
trying misdemeanor cases” 336 in Maryland by the mideighteenth century and by the century’s end it had been put
on a secure statutory footing.337 Bond was circumspect in his
claims, however. He clearly indicated that until 1823 jury
waiver was “resorted to chiefly in minor cases”338 and only for
misdemeanors.339 His moderate conclusion was merely that
his findings “suggest the need of an investigation of facts
before any statement is made that trial by jury in criminal
cases was the only form known to the early American law. It
is possible to assume too close an adherence to English
practice in the colonies.”340
Frank Grinnell’s findings were more startling. Drawing
from the recently published Records of the Court of Assistants
of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay,341 which covered the
years 1673 to 1692,342 Grinnell showed “to the point of
demonstration”343 that Bay colony defendants had the ability
to choose between jury or bench trials even when prosecuted
for such serious felonies as adultery, manslaughter,
and treason.344 Drawing from additional sources,345 Grinnell
suggested that statutes authorizing this practice dated back
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335. Bond, supra note 263, at 699.
336. Id. at 700.
337. Bond, supra note 263, at 700–01; Bond, Allowing Defendants, supra note
332, at 91–92.
338. Bond, supra note 263, at 701.
339. Id. at 699–701 (every reported instance is a misdemeanor); Bond,
Allowing Defendants, supra note 332, at 91 (statutory authorization for
misdemeanor trials).
340. Bond, supra note 263, at 699.
341. 1–3 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1901–28). Volume 1, which is the only volume referred
to by Grinnell was published in 1901. See Harvard University, HOLLIS
Catalogue Entry No. 001521139 (title search, last conducted on 11/30/2009).
Volume 2, covering records from 1630 to 1644 was issued in 1904. See id.
Volume 3, which was released in 1928 after Grinnell’s article was written,
contains fragmentary records dating from 1642 to 1673. See id.
342. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 26 (citing only to Volume 1 and giving these
years).
343. Id. at 29.
344. Id. at 26–30.
345. Id. at 20–26, 29–30.
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to 1634.346 In sum, Grinnell’s findings were that seventeenth
century colonial Massachusetts recognized defendants’ “right
to a jury trial as an optional right” 347 that permitted
defendants to elect either trial by jury or the bench.348 In
Massachusetts, bench trial practice was not only older than in
Maryland,349 but wider in scope.
Massachusetts’ bench trial practice was not as
continuous, however. Waiver-based bench trial for serious
crime in colonial Massachusetts apparently ended in or
shortly after 1685.350 The last example Grinnell found in the
published Court of Assistants records was from 1685, 351
although the Court’s records continued until 1692, the year
the Court was dissolved.352 Grinnell knew of no later instance
of any Massachusetts court conducting a waiver-based bench
trial.353 Of course, Grinnell also knew that at the time he
wrote no Massachusetts colonial court records later than 1692
had been published.354 Yet for a variety of reasons, such as
changes in the wording of colonial statutes governing
criminal procedure,355 he spurned explaining the disappearance of the bench trials in terms of the unavailability of
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346. Id. at 26. In at least some of his conclusions, Grinnell was following
CHARLES HILKEY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1630–
86 (1910). See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 26 (referring to Hilkey).
347. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 29 (emphasis in original).
348. Id. at 15, 26, 29.
349. Id. at 15.
350. Various dates are suggested by the sources, none later than 1694. See
Commonwealth v. Rose, 153 N.E. 537, 540 (Mass. 1926) (from 1694 on, no
record of bench trials); Towne, supra note 61, at 125 (saying lasted reported
case is 1685). On p. 128, Towne gives 1695 as a date for a mention of bench
trial, but that seems to be a misprint since the Court of Assistants was
dissolved before then. Towne, supra note 61, at 128.
351. Grinnell does not date most of the cases he mentions. The last case he
covers is “the case of William Coward,” which is on pp. 319–20 of Volume 1 of
the Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay.
Grinnell, supra note 59, at 29. Coward’s case is on a later page than Joseph
Holmes Sen & Jun’s case, which is the last case covered by Griswold and
Towne. Griswold, supra note 54, at 663; Towne, supra note 61, at 125.
352. Towne, supra note 61, at 128 n.25 (court dissolved after 1691).
353. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 11–12.
354. Id. at 29.
355. Id. at 30, 32–33. Among Grinnell’s other reasons were the absence of
waiver-based jury trials when published records began again in the early
Republic era and the opinion, the opinion of the colonial and state bar, and the
failure of defendants to request it. Id. at 11, 37.
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356. For a contrasting example, see infra text accompanying notes 379–80
(discussing Erwin Griswold’s analysis).
357. See material cited infra note 391.
358. See Towne, supra note 61, at 128–29 (giving essentially the same
analysis as Grinnell).
359. See Grinnell, supra note 59, at 30–33.
360. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 30; John Hassam, Account of the Early
Suffolk Recorders, 12 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 203, 234–36 (1899); Towne,
supra note 61, at 128. The colony’s establishment of Harvard College was
among the grounds for forfeiting its charter, for the colony had not been granted
power to create a corporation.
361. Province of Massachusetts Bay, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Province_of_Massachusetts_Bay (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
362. See John Lund, The Contested Will of “Goodman Penn”: Anglo-New
England Politics, Culture, and Legalities, 1688-1716, 27 L. & HIST. 549, 556–57,
568, 579, 582–84 (2009) (discussing cross-currents in London’s program of
seeking greater control over Massachusetts).
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archival evidence.356 Instead, he presciently gave an account
that has withstood the subsequent publication of a fair
amount of of eighteenth-century Massachusetts judicial
records,357 and remains the accepted explanation to this
day.358
Grinnell’s explanation turned on the impact of England’s
Glorious Revolution on Massachusetts.359 In the run up to the
Revolution, one of James II’s arbitrary acts was to instigate
judicial proceedings that in 1684 revoked the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay’s charter and transferred the colony’s
governance directly into his hands.360 After the revolutionary
tumult subsided, England’s new regime reconstituted
Massachusetts in 1692 by merging the formerly separate
colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Maine, Nantucket,
Martha’s Vineyard and parts of Nova Scotia into a new entity,
the Province of Massachusetts Bay.361
As a general matter, the Province government was more
tightly bound to England’s imperial structure and more
closely supervised by London than the colony had been.362
More than before, the Province’s governors were the Crown’s
agents. As the Governors appointed provincial judges, the
judges also were viewed as representing the imperial, rather
than the local, government to a greater degree than before
the Glorious Revolution. According to Grinnell, this shift in
the locus of government affected the colonist’s perspective on
juries and bench trials. “While they had their own judges
under the colony,” he said,
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they provided expressly for an optional right to jury trial
and exercised it as such; but when they had judges under
the Province Charter whom they thought would be under
the influence of the crown they tried to emphasize their
desire to have all questions of fact tried by juries . . . .363

Indeed, the desire to emphasize the sanctity of jury trial
was exacerbated by the developing conflict over the Privy
Council’s policy of enforcing the trade laws in Admiralty
courts where defendants had no right to jury trial.364 In this
new era of less locally-identified government and Navigation
Act enforcement, which lasted up to the Revolution, the
colonists’ focus of concern was “with the question of a man’s
right to a jury when he asked for it.”365 “[P]resumably nobody
bothered about [the] question of any one’s wanting to waive a
jury,” Grinnell concluded, and soon the “optional character of
the right to a jury established . . . by the common law of
Massachusetts in the colonial period” faded from “general
knowledge.”366
Given that both Judge Bond and Frank Grinnell were
staunch supporters of reforming twentieth century law to
permit
a
defendant’s
jury
waiver,
their
frank
acknowledgment of the limits of their historical findings must
be admired. 367 Nonetheless, in the “criminal justice is in
crisis” atmosphere of the 1920s, some reform-minded lawyers
were far less circumspect when they drew from Bond’s and
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 79 Side B
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363. Grinnell, supra note 59, at 32.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 33 (emphasis removed).
366. Id. Many factors contributed to the fading of the collective memory,
including the fact that the 1641 Body of Liberties was never printed and the
manuscript copies were lost. Id. One copy was discovered in the Boston library
in 1843 and received its first printing at that time. Id. at 22.
367. Without detracting from Bond’s and Grinnell’s scholarly restraint, I
must note that they had less need to overstate their conclusions. Bond was a
judge in one of the few states where waiver-based jury trial was already allowed
so his limited conclusion did not matter to practice in his own state. Grinnell
thought his historical findings grounded an argument that defendant’s jury
waiver was permitted by the current Massachusetts constitution. Basically, his
contention was that optional jury trial was made a part of Massachusetts’s
“fundamental” law shortly after the colony’s founding; under a strict
interpretation of successive state constitutions, the optional right had never
been repealed; and it had been preserved in the forms of trial procedure when
defendants were asked, until 1835, how they wished to be tried. See Grinnell,
supra note 59, at 12–14, 33–38, 49.
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Grinnell’s work and the work of other historians.
S.
Chesterfield Oppenheim, for example, writing in the
Michigan Law Review in 1927 claimed, “Researches in legal
history have thrown grave doubt upon, if not dispelled, the
traditional idea that a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions
was intended as an exclusive mode of determining the fate of
the accused.”368 And, as the fruits of historical research
permeated the 1920s legal consciousness, commentators
began to assert, without any need for citation, “From the
traditional viewpoint, the jury has been regarded as the sole
historical method of trial both in England and in colonial
America. Legal research indicates, however, that an option
was offered between waiver of jury and jury trial both in
England and in colonial America.”369
Perhaps the most egregious use of Bond’s and Grinnell’s
research was made by Erwin Griswold when, as a young
lawyer working in the Solicitor General’s Office, 370 he
wrote the historical section of the brief the United States
submitted in the Patton case. 371 In the brief, 372 Griswold
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368. Oppenheim, supra note 207, at 696 (citing Grinnell, supra note 59,
among others); see also id. at 697 (“It is also likely that the legal profession
generally has been too confident in the assumption that in the colonial period of
American history, criminal offenses of misdemeanor and felony grade were
always tried by a jury.”); id. at 698 n.9 (citing Grinnell’s and Bond’s articles);
Recent Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064 (saying Grinnell’s and Bond’s research
“is of some significance”).
369. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 163. But see Perkins, supra note 33, at 21–
22 (evenhanded discussion of Bond’s and Grinnell’s scholarship).
370. At the time, Griswold was three years out of Harvard Law School,
having graduated summa cum laude in 1927. Dennis Hevesi, Erwin Griswold
Is Dead at 90; Served as a Solicitor General, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at B10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/obituaries/erwin-griswold-is
-dead-at-90-served-as-a-solicitor-general.html?scp=1&sq=Erwin%20Griswold%2
0is%20dead%20at%2090&st=cse. Griswold was to become one of the leading
figures in twentieth century American law and legal education. Id. He served
as Dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty-one years, from 1946 to 1967 and
left that position to serve as Solicitor General of the United States from 1976 to
1973 under Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Id. Although he was a life-long
Republican, as early as 1950 he opposed McCarthy; in the 1960s, he was among
the first law professors to defend the Warren Court’s reform of criminal
procedure; and he was an ardent supporter of civil rights who testified as an
expert for the NAACP and on behalf of Thurgood Marshall’s appointment to the
Supreme Court. Id.
371. Griswold is listed as an “Attorney” on the brief. See Brief for the United
States, supra note 292, at 68. I attribute the historical section to Griswold
because four years later he published a slightly expanded version as a law
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described Bond’s work on Maryland without mentioning, as
Bond had,373 that all Maryland nonjury trials before the 1820s
were for misdemeanors and “chiefly in minor cases.”374 Not
only did he avoid explicitly stating the implicit limit on
Maryland’s colonial bench-trial practice, but he concluded his
discussion of Maryland with the observation that:
The Maryland practice since the eighteenth century has
had a continuous development into the modern trial by the
court. In the year 1923 over 90 per cent of all cases tried
in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City were tried
without a jury under this procedure which finds its origin
quite definitely in the provincial practice.375

To describe the singular history of Maryland bench trials
as having a “continuous development” and an “origin . . . in
provincial practice” is literally true. However, it masks the
critically significant fact that Maryland’s experience with
waiver-based bench trials did not involve felonies until almost
forty years after the Founding.
As for Massachusetts, Griswold’s brief recounted in great
detail the precedents Grinnell discussed in his 1923 article.
Griswold’s account was “summarized from Mr. Grinnell’s
article with a few additions.”376 Because all the additions
were cases found in the Records of the Court of Assistants,377
none of them came from a period later than 1692.378 Thus
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review article. See Griswold, supra note 54. The expansion involved adding a
section on the English background. Id. at 658–60. The section on colonial
America is taken almost verbatim from the brief. Compare id. at 660–69, with
Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33–47. The only noticeable
difference is the order in which a couple of the colonies are discussed. In the
article, Griswold never revealed his participation in the Patton litigation. See
infra text accompanying note 441.
372. The following remarks on the brief are true about the subsequent
article, too. I will give parallel cites to both discussions.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 338–39.
374. Bond, supra note 263, at 701. For Griswold’s discussion of Maryland,
see Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 42–46. See also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 667–69.
375. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 46; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 669.
376. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 34; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 660 n.24.
377. The additional cases involve William Pope and Joseph Homes Senior
and Junior. See Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 38–39; Griswold,
supra note 54, at 663.
378. See supra text accompanying note 352 (recounting that the Court of
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Assistants’s records continue until 1969 when the Court was dissolved).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 359–66 (discussing Grinnell).
380. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 39; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 663.
381. See, e.g., 1–16 PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686–1859 (David Konig ed.
1978–82); JOSEPH SMITH, COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS,
1639–1702: THE PYNCHON COURT RECORD (1961); William Jeffrey, Early New
England Court Records - A Bibliography of Published Materials, 1 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 119, 127–40 (1957) (discussing Massachusetts). Manuscript records also
have been made more accessible through the publication of finding guides.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 359–66 (discussing Grinnell).
383. Griswold, supra note 54, at 669.
384. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 34; see also id. at 42
(covering New Jersey even though it is not mentioned on Griswold’s list on the
page cited).
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just like Grinnell, Griswold faced the problem of accounting
for the apparent end of waiver-based bench trials at the end
of the seventeenth century. But unlike Grinnell, Griswold did
not tie the end of Massachusetts bench trials to the change
from the Colony to the Province of Massachusetts Bay, nor
mention that Grinnell had.379 Rather, Griswold embraced the
explanation that Grinnell spurned. According to Griswold,
the apparent end of Massachusetts bench trials after 1692
“may be explained by the fact that no records of criminal
cases in this period have been printed, and is, no evidence
that the practice did not continue.”380
It is now seventy years after Griswold’s writing, and the
subsequent publication of additional volumes of provincial
Massachusetts court records has yet to support Griswold’s
speculative explanation. 381 Yet Griswold’s suggestion was
plausible when it was made in 1930. Grinnell’s nuanced
consideration of countervailing facts382 was not necessarily a
more convincing account. This was especially so since
Griswold’s claim that colonial archives had yet to be explored
was complemented by new examples of jury waiver that
he uncovered through “extended research” 383 into the few
published records of the rest of the colonies. Merely by
reading the random assortment of existing published legal
material from other colonies, Griswold discovered “examples
of waiver of jury” 384 in four more colonies as well as in
colonial-era Vermont.
Going from the earliest and least important to the latest
and most important findings, Griswold’s research found the
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following additional examples of jury waiver:
(a) New Hampshire - a 1679 statute that seemed to
provide for waiver-based bench trial but which never went
into force because it did not receive royal assent;385
(b) Pennsylvania - one case dating from 1685 which
involved a bench trial following a guilty plea;386
(c) New Jersey - a 1738 statute “authorizing any two
magistrates to try persons charged with larceny of goods
under the value of twenty shillings” which remained in
effect throughout the colonial era and into the nineteenth
century;387
(d) Vermont - one “trial held July 1, 1779 [that] was before
the court without a jury;”388 and
(e) Connecticut - three criminal cases tried in the 1790s
involving “serious crimes” which “allow[ed] a defendant to
waive his right to trial by jury.”389

From our perspective, Griswold’s additional findings may
seem remarkably thin and insubstantial, perhaps because
decades of additional colonial-record publishing and
research has added very little to them.390 In addition, some
of Griswold’s findings have been debunked. 391 Given the
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385. Id. at 40–41; see also Griswold, supra note 54, at 664.
386. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 46; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 666. The proceeding in the Pennsylvania case mirrored the
English practice of “submission,” which was permitted for trials of minor
misdemeanors. See Bond, supra note 263, at 699–700 (discussing colonial
Maryland’s submission practice); Griswold, supra note 54, at 658–59; Towne,
supra note 61, at 136–38.
387. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 42; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 666.
388. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 40; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 664.
389. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 41; see also Griswold,
supra note 54, at 665.
390. See, e.g., Towne, supra note 61, at 131 (additional colonial Connecticut
statutes authorizing jury waiver which were limited to misdemeanors). A sense
of the scope of colonial court records published since the 1930s may be seen by
consulting Jeffrey, supra note 381; William Jeffrey, Early American Court
Records - A Bibliography of Printed Materials: The Middle Colonies, 39 U. CIN.
L. REV. 685 (1970). The Internet has made even more material widely
available. See Morris Cohen, Researching Legal History in the Digital Age, 99
L. LIB. J. 377 (2007).
391. See, e.g., Towne, supra note 61, at 133–34 (suggesting New Hampshire’s
statute did not apply to criminal prosecutions); id. at 144 (saying New Jersey’s
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limitation of Maryland’s bench trial practice to misdemeanors
and the cessation of Massachusetts’s waiver-based bench
trials at the end of the seventeenth century, Connecticut
seems to be the only jurisdiction that permitted waiver-based
bench trials for serious crimes during the Founding era.392
Nevertheless, in 1930, Bond’s, Grinnell’s, and Griswold’s
discoveries were new, exciting, and may reasonably have been
thought to hold promise of more to come. This was especially
so in light of how few colonial records had been printed and
studied.393
Griswold began the historical section of the government’s
brief with the modestly suggestive caption: “Waiver of trial by
jury, even in trials for serious offenses, was not unknown at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”394 He ended the
section, however, with a stronger statement. Given the
existence of colonial-era bench trials:
Recognition of the right of waiver in cases where
the defendant deemed it to be his interest so to do
could not . . . have been regarded as inconsistent with the
institution of trial by jury . . . . [T]he judicial history of
the Colonies indicates that there was no sentiment
against waiver of such a right. The practice of waiver
being known, stronger language would have been used [in
the Constitution] had there been any intention to preclude
it.395

04/16/2012 17:10:32

statute “authorized a waiver of nonjury trial, rather than waiver of jury trial”);
id. (“not clear what [the] Vermont case represents”).
392. The Connecticut practice was a rarity and it ended by the turn of the
nineteenth century. Id. at 145. The results of twentieth-century research into
the history of bench trial may be summarized as follows: in the seventeenth
century, a few of the colonies permitted bench trials. See Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 29–31 (1965); Towne, supra note 61, at 124–45. By the
eighteenth century, bench trial practice survived in Connecticut, where it was a
rarity, and in Maryland, where it was more frequent but confined to
“misdemeanor cases.” See Singer, 380 U.S. at 30 (no bench trial in Maryland in
a “major case” until 1823); Towne, supra note 61, 131–32, 142.
393. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33–34 (implicitly
making this argument); Griswold, supra note 54, at 669.
394. Brief for the United States, supra note 292, at 33.
395. Id. at 47.
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In contrast to the Government’s brief, which had
historically-informed sections focused on colonial and
Founding-era material, the defendant’s brief relied entirely
on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century federal
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precedents, state precedents, and two treatise writers.396 It
contained no discussion of the English common law or of the
colonial and Founding eras. Defendant’s counsel provided no
history to counter Griswold’s, nor any analysis of Griswold’s
sources to limit what he said. Defendant’s reliance on
precedent was understandable; their failure to treat the issue
historically was shortsighted.
4. Sutherland’s Agreement with the Historical Critique
of the No-Waiver Rule

04/16/2012 17:10:32

396. See Brief of Appellants at ii, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276
(1930) (No. 53) (Index to Authorities).
397. Patton, 281 U.S. at 281–82 (argument of counsel). The pages of the U.S.
Reports cited here, which contain the counsel’s argument, are omitted from
Westlaw’s reproduction of the case report. See id. at 276.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 373–95 (discussing the government’s
brief).
399. See Patton, 281 U.S. at 281 (argument of Solicitor General Hughes);
supra text accompanying note 394 (discussing the government’s brief).
400. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306.
401. See supra text accompanying note 317 (discussing Sutherland’s views on
whether the federal common law should permit jury waiver).
402. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306.
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Before the Patton litigation, Justice Sutherland may or
may not have known about the 1920s historical critique of the
no-waiver rule’s claim to be the intended rule of the Founding
generation. If not, he certainly learned about it during the
Supreme Court’s proceedings from the government’s oral
argument 397 as well from its brief. 398 In deciding Patton,
Sutherland clearly expressed his agreement with the
Government’s version of the no-waiver rule’s emergent
history by noting, with words nearly identical to Griswold’s,399
that “in the Colonies such a waiver and trial by the court
without a jury was by no means unknown, as the many
references contained in the brief of the Solicitor General
conclusively show.”400
Sutherland made this remark during his discussion of
whether the federal common law should permit jury waiver.401
He made it as his initial argument countering the force
of his admission that jury waiver was not permitted at
common law.402 It may be surprising that Sutherland had not
mentioned the new historical findings earlier in his opinion as
part of his analysis of jury waiver’s constitutionality.
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Perhaps Sutherland omitted mentioning them then because
of limitations in the material originalists of his day thought
appropriate evidence for constitutional argument. Until the
modern originalist movement in the 1970s, originalist
Justices generally drew their arguments from a limited array
of sources, such as Madison’s notes, the Federalist papers,
and treatises discussing the common law. They did not delve
into Founding-era practices even when contemporaneous
practice provided convincing evidence of the issue under
consideration.403
Whatever reason Sutherland had for not mentioning the
emergent history as part of his constitutional analysis, the
question here is whether Sutherland knew and agreed with
the 1920s historical critique of the no-waiver rule’s claim to
be the Founding generation’s intended rule. There can be no
doubt that he did. When Sutherland decided Patton, he had
absorbed what Griswold wrote in the government’s brief and
agreed that jury waiver was “by no means unknown” at the
Founding.404
5. Sutherland’s Patton Opinion and Motivated
Reasoning

04/16/2012 17:10:32

403. The petty crime exception to Article III’s jury trial mandate is an
illustrative example. Compare Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904)
(relying on Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES and Madison’s notes), and Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888) (relying on Story’s COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION and Madison’s notes), with Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note
10, at 917 (passim) (showing common law practices evidencing the petty crime
exception). Perhaps the material originalists like Sutherland relied on reflects
their focus on Framer intent rather than on original understanding or original
public meaning. Perhaps it reflects limitations in readily available material.
404. Patton, 281 U.S. at 306.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 183–91 (discussing Sutherland’s
jurisprudence).
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The ultimate question is what influence the societal
demand for jury waiver, the attack on the no-waiver rule’s
claim to be a wise rule of contemporary public policy, the
emergent body of historical scholarship questioning the
no-waiver rule’s claim to be the Founding generation’s
intended rule had on Patton’s ruling upholding jury
waiver’s constitutionality. Given Sutherland’s originalist
jurisprudence,405 only the historical critique should have had
any influence. That critique, however, was only incipient. By
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a. Motivated Reasoning
Motivated reasoning is an umbrella term for a complex of
psychological mechanisms that pervasively influences human
reasoning, creating the tendency for individuals to utilize a
variety of cognitive mechanisms to arrive, through a process
of apparently unbiased reasoning, at the conclusion they
privately desired to arrive at all along.407 That a preference

04/16/2012 17:10:32

406. Koppelman, supra note 259, at 749. An example of what Koppelman
describes as “phony originalism” is Justice Thomas’s selective citation to “the
findings of originalist scholarship that support the result he is inclined to
reach—sweeping contrary evidence under the rug—while claiming that he is
merely following the intentions of the Framers.” Id. at 742–43.
407. Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
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itself, the new historical information would likely have been
insufficient to overturn the Constitution’s clear text and onehundred-forty years of constitutional practice and precedent
on the subject.
None of these developments when viewed in isolation
should have been sufficient for Sutherland to reject the nowaiver rule. But all together—the social need and societal
demand, the strong policy preference, and the new and
suggestive history—may have had a synergy that was greater
than any of its component parts. The new history may have
provided an opening that allowed Sutherland with a complete
sense of rectitude to find his, and his society’s, desired
outcome in the Constitution’s original meaning. Sutherland’s
Patton opinion was either an intellectually bankrupt,
meretricious example of “phony originalism” 406 or a classic
example of the phenomenon psychologists call “motivated
reasoning.”
Ultimately, there are no indubitable grounds for
preferring one explanation for Sutherland’s judgment over
the other. The remarkable weakness of his constitutional
analysis suggests a result-oriented explanation. Yet, there
are indicia of the influence of motivated reasoning. Due to
these indicia, the motivated reasoning explanation will be
explored because it paints more sympathetic portrait of
Sutherland as a conscientious Justice while, at the same
time, posing a more challenging problem for the practice of
originalist jurisprudence.
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for a particular outcome unconsciously biases reasoning
processes is such a wide-spread, habitual, and persistent
human trait that observers suggest it is an “inherent”408 and
“immutable characteristic of human nature”409 that serves a
variety of important psychic functions. Motivated reasoning
promotes psychological comfort by reducing dissonance
among a person’s various beliefs410 and between what she
desires and what she thinks is true and moral.411 Motivated
reasoning also allows people to maintain a positive,
consistent, up-right self-image while seeking what they
want. 412 Whatever its function, motivated reasoning is so
strong, pervasive, and subtle that research shows that “even
people’s sincere efforts to find the correct answer are biased
by their predispositions.”413
Among the biasing cognitive processes most associated
with motivated reasoning are tendencies to
(a) remember or look for evidence supporting the desired
conclusion rather than rebutting evidence or evidence of
disfavored outcomes;414
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Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 653 (1999). The classic
article in the extensive social psychology literature is Kunda, supra note 21, at
480. See also EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 13–79 (2009); THOMAS GILOVICH,
HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 75–94 (1991). For discussions in legal literature, see, e.g.,
Hanson & Kysar, supra, at 653–54; Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the
Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 259–84 (discussing
“unconscious processes,” including “motivated reasoning”); Christopher
Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE
L.J. 307, 352–59 (2001).
408. Frank Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 197 n.77
(2008) (book review) (describing motivated reasoning as an “inherent
psychological attitude”).
409. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 407, at 654; see also id. at 633 (“cognitive
illusions,” which include motivated reasoning, affect the human reasoning
process “with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence”).
410. Kunda, supra note 21, at 483–85 (discussing “dissonance theory”).
411. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Problems Created
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 995–97 (2009).
412. Kunda, supra note 21, at 485–86; Donald Langevoort, Ego, Human
Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 855–56 (1995); David Yosifon, The
Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 259, 265–66 (2009).
413. Frank Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399,
1406 n.54 (2009).
414. Kunda, supra note 21, at 481–83, 485; Timothy Malloy, Disclosure
Stories, 32 F.S.U. L. REV. 617, 652–53 (2005).
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(b) exaggerate the persuasiveness of evidence supporting
the
desired
conclusion
while
minimizing
the
persuasiveness of evidence rebutting it or favoring other
outcomes;415
(c) require more proof of disfavored conclusions while
requiring less proof of a favored outcome;416 and
(d) allocate the burden of proof to disfavored conclusions
while granting a presumption of validity to the favored
outcome.417

In addition, the more one needs to make a decision under
time pressure,418 initially favors a particular outcome,419
“faces weak consequences for being wrong,”420 or thinks an
issue is important,421 difficult,422 or open,423 the more likely it
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415. Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope:
Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUT. L. REV. 919, 964 (2008) (“The
psychological concept of ‘motivated reasoning’ theorizes that people will perceive
information supportive of their pre-existing beliefs as more legitimate than that
contradicting their preferences”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 407, at 646;
Kunda, supra note 21, at 489–91.
416. Susan Bandes, Protecting the Innocent as the Primary Value of the
Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 420 (2009). As Anthony
Page writes:
How then does motivated reasoning occur? Gilovich suggests that
decision makers in fact ask a different question depending on how
eager they are to reach a particular conclusion.
“For desired
conclusions . . . it is as if we ask ourselves ‘Can I believe this?,’ but for
unpalatable conclusions we ask, ‘Must I believe this?’ ” The legal
analog would be that for desired conclusions one asks, “Could a
reasonable person believe it?” whereas for undesirable conclusions one
asks, “Would all reasonable people believe it?” The burden of
persuasion is much lower for the first question.
Page, supra note 407, at 264.
417. See, e.g., Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect
Beliefs About Its Unconstitutionality?: An Experimental Test, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 219, 220 (2008); Page, supra note 407, at 262–65. For a discussion of
the multitude of processes through which motivated reasoning works, see
GILOVICH, supra note 407, at 78–84.
418. Kunda, supra note 21, at 481; Glen Whitman & Roger Koppl, Rational
Bias in Forensic Science, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 69, 84 (2010).
419. Kunda, supra note 21, at 492–93.
420. Whitman & Koppl, supra note 418, at 84.
421. Susan A. Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange
Persistence of the American Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 21, 35, 40
(2008) (discussing reasoning “when . . . attitudes are deeply held” or “intense
emotional investment”).
422. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of
Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1513 (2010).
423. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
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ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 433 (2002); Baum, supra note 422, at 1513
(discussing uncertainty); Feldman & Teichman, supra note 411, at 995–96.
424. Kunda, supra note 21, at 482. For the material in this paragraph see
also Furgeson et al., supra note 417, at 220; Kunda, supra note 21, at 482–83,
490; Page, supra note 407, at 264–65.
425. Kunda, supra note 21, at 483 (internal quotation marks removed).
426. Id. at 482–83; see also id. at 490.
427. Id. at 481.
428. Id. at 493.
429. Id. at 481, 493.
430. Id. at 493.
431. Id. at 487; see also id. at 490.
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is that motivated reasoning will control the judgment
reached.
There are limits to motivated reasoning’s power and its
distorting effect is subject to constraints. As Ziva Kunda
writes, “[p]eople do not seem to be at liberty to conclude
whatever they want to conclude;”424 there must be sufficient
grounds to “maintain an illusion of objectivity.” 425 The
psychic goal is to appear open-minded, even-handed, and
“rational” while so far as possible “construct[ing] a
justification of [the] desired conclusion that would persuade a
dispassionate observer.”426 Due to the need to appear neutral,
one of the most prominent constraints on motivated reasoning
arises when a person knows that her conclusions and
supporting arguments will be reviewed by others. 427 This
knowledge heightens awareness that the reasons propounded
must be stronger so they can be plausible to a variety of
people with different preconceptions of their own.428
Unfortunately, external review is not a satisfactory
constraint for motivated reasoning.429 Research also shows
that thinking hard about an issue does not necessarily
eliminate or moderate the biasing effect of motivated
reasoning.430 Indeed, there is evidence that “extensive
processing caused by [the desire to be accurate] may facilitate
the construction of justifications for desired conclusions.
Thus people expecting to incur heavier costs if their desired
beliefs turn about to be wrong may expend greater effort to
justify these desired beliefs.”431
In other words, although external review and
deliberation over an issue may moderate the distortions of
motivated reasoning, they may also exacerbate the problem
by increasing the resources, effort, and creativity devoted to
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reaching decisions that are consistent with initial
preferences. In the end, external review and self-reflection
may lead not to compromise but to “to the solidifying (or
ossifying) of individual opinion . . . [and] the polarization of
group opinion.”432
b. Justice Sutherland’s Patton Opinion as an
Example of Motivated Reasoning

04/16/2012 17:10:32

432. Bandes, supra note 421, at 40.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 368–69 (discussing 1920s lawyers
who opposed the no-waiver rule).
434. Grant, supra note 34, at 156 is the only critical commentary I have
uncovered and he merely suggests the case’s “theory” is unsound and predicts
that “common sense” will confine Patton’s ruling to the “waiver of one or two
jurors and not a waiver of jury trial.” Grant’s prediction was wrong. See supra
text accompanying note 180 (discussing Patton’s extension to complete waiver).
435. Recent Decisions, supra note 61, at 1064; see also Grant, supra note 34,
at 149–53; Perkins, supra note 33, at 43–47. Grant did not hesitate to severely
criticize Sutherland’s analysis of whether congressional statute granted trial
courts authority to conduct bench trials. Grant, supra note 34, at 153–56. Yet
Grant’s commentary on Sutherland’s constitutional analysis was a supportive
“[t]his may be true enough.” Id. at 153.
436. Handley, supra note 266, at 48.
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Motivated reasoning already has been illustrated in this
Article by the non-historian lawyers who exaggerated the
implications of Bond’s and Grinnell’s work and felt
comfortable asserting that the no-waiver rule’s historical
foundations had been thoroughly repudiated. 433 Motivated
reasoning also is illustrated by Patton’s favorable reception in
the legal community and the absence of contemporary
criticism of Sutherland’s constitutional analysis.434 In a time
when fidelity to the Constitution’s original meaning was still
the dominant constitutional norm, it is telling that there was
no public or scholarly claim that the case should have come
out the other way, even by commentators who noted that
Patton “reverses the doctrine of earlier Federal cases.” 435
Post-Patton, the conventional view seems to be that the
Constitution’s criminal trial “provisions would seem to be
mandatory in nature and for many years were so construed
by the federal courts. However, the case of Patton v. United
States . . . took the opposite view and dispelled any doubt that
had previously existed.”436
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437. Griswold, supra note 54; see also supra text accompanying notes 370–95
(discussing the government’s Patton brief).
438. Griswold, supra note 54, at 656.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 304–20.
443. Sutherland, of course, wrote many opinions that were criticized in his
time. But I suspect those opinions, though criticized by many, had far more
support than Patton would have had had it come out the other way.
444. See supra text accompanying note 400.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 86 Side A

Perhaps the heights of motivated reasoning were reached
by Erwin Griswold when, four years after the Patton decision,
he turned the historical analysis he had written for the
government’s brief into a law review article. 437 Although
Griswold was now writing as a scholar rather than an
advocate, the only new material he added to the brief was an
acknowledgment that Patton “must have seemed to many like
a departure from a position once thought well settled,” 438
and a claim that the “ample evidence” contained in his
article “furnish[es] a sure historical basis for the decision.”439
Without divulging his role in the litigation, Griswold assured
his readers that the Patton decision “represent[ed] no
departure from the Constitution as the framers intended it”440
and found “its sound basis, not only in the reasons advanced
by the Court, but also in the history of the period when the
Constitution was formulated.”441
What about Sutherland?
Having a marked policy
442
preference favoring jury waiver, he may be described as
highly motivated to rule that way. In addition, Sutherland
could anticipate that there would be little criticism of his
opinion should he find jury waiver constitutional because jury
waiver was by far the more popular outcome.443 To the extent
that criticism is a constraint on motivated reasoning, it would
not be operative in this situation.
Still, Sutherland’s conception of the judge’s role
counseled against reading his policy preferences into the
Constitution. Since he was an originalist, only his agreement
with the no-waiver rule’s emergent history should have
affected his judgment. But that history was only suggestive
and Sutherland never expressly connected his belief that jury
waiver “was by no means unknown”444 in the colonies and
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445. The remark was made as part of Sutherland’s discussion of whether the
no-waiver rule should be adopted as a matter of federal common law.
Sutherland took up that discussion only after (and because) he had ruled that
jury waiver was permitted by the Constitution.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 200–08.
447. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930) (Justice Sutherland
suggesting Founding era silence on the question of jury waiver cuts against
finding that rule was established by the Constitution).
448. Id.
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early Republic with his constitutional analysis.445
In light of the strength of Sutherland’s predisposition
toward permitting jury waiver, studies of motivated
reasoning suggest that it would take very little evidence to
convince him, to make him sincerely believe, that jury waiver
was the “intended” constitutional rule. Due to the biasing
effect of motivated reasoning, it would have taken compelling
evidence to overcome Sutherland’s natural tendency to (1)
presume the pro-waiver position was constitutionally correct,
(2) look for evidence favoring that position, and, finally, (3)
exaggerate the significance of the evidence he found. This
description of Sutherland’s natural inclination describes
fairly well what the analysis above shows to have occurred in
Sutherland’s opinion.
Sutherland’s constitutional analysis began with a
discussion of prior precedent that was a negative argument
focused on showing that the no-waiver position was
unreasonable.446 The argument’s unstated purpose was to set
up the pro-waiver position as the only position that a rational
Framer or delegate to a ratifying convention could have held.
Sutherland short positive argument, which takes up only
two pages in the United States Reports, shows that it did not
take much evidence to convince him to rule in favor of jury
waiver. All that was involved was Founding era silence,
Blackstone’s and Story’s description of the defendant’s right
of jury trial as a “privilege” and the more permissive
draftsmanship of Sixth Amendment. Sutherland found that
this woefully inadequate evidence was sufficient to place the
burden of proof on those wishing to retain the no-waiver
rule 447 and made it “reasonable to conclude” that the
Founders meant to establish jury trial as a waivable privilege
in the absence of a statement that they wanted the no-waiver
rule.448
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Together, Sutherland’s negative and positive arguments,
which were deployed to support the remarkable conclusion
that the Framer’s misdrafted Article III’s jury provision so
that its words were more “imperative” than they meant,449
read as a textbook example of how Thomas Gilovich says
motivated reasoning operates. “It is clear,” he says:
that we tend to use different criteria to evaluate
propositions or conclusions we desire, and those we abhor.
For propositions we want to believe, we ask only that the
evidence does not force us to believe otherwise—a rather
easy standard to meet given the equivocal nature of much
information . . . . For desired conclusions . . . it is as if we
ask ourselves, “Can I believe this?”450

04/16/2012 17:10:32

449. See id. (“The reasonable inference is that the concern of the framers of
the Constitution was to make clear that the right of trial by jury should remain
inviolable, to which end no language was deemed too imperative”).
450. GILOVICH, supra note 407, at 83–84 (emphasis in original). Gilovich
describes our approach to disfavored conclusions as “ask[ing] whether the
evidence compels such a distasteful conclusion. . . . [I]t is as if we ask ourselves
. . . “Must I believe this?” Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
451. See supra text accompanying note 400 (quoting Justice Sutherland).
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Sutherland’s review of prior precedent in Patton, by
showing that reasonable Framers would favor jury waiver,
implicitly functioned to place a very light burden of proof on
arguments favoring that outcome and a correspondingly
heavy burden on the no-waiver principle by intimating that
only irrational Framers would ordain such a rule.
Sutherland’s positive argument expressly functioned the
same way. Given the reduced burden of proof, Sutherland
may have felt that it was met by the arguments he presented
from Blackstone, Story, and the Sixth Amendment.
Certainly, the newly discovered evidence, mined from colonial
archives and compiled in Griswold’s brief showing that jury
waiver “was by no means unknown”451 in the Colonies, was
sufficient to allow the pro-jury waiver position to meet the
“Can I believe this?” standard. Moreover, the emergent
history was not only sufficient to meet the reduced standard,
but it would do so with the added psychic benefit of
demonstrating responsiveness to the latest trends in
historical scholarship.
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452. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 276 (1930).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 263–303.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 323–95.
455. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 323–404, 433–50.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 434–36 (discussing the favorable
response to Patton).
458. I make no criticism on originalist theory per se except to say that a legal
theory that cannot be practiced properly is not a viable theory.
459. See, e.g., Douglas Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 236–37 (2010); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
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This Article has examined the legal world of which
Justice Sutherland was a part when he decided Patton v.
United States. 452 It has shown that in the decade before
Patton there was a felt need to streamline the federal
criminal-trial process by reducing the frequency of jury
trial.453 At the same time, there was a new trend in historical
scholarship 454 suggesting that prohibiting defendant’s jury
waiver was not what the Founding generation intended when
they wrote Article III’s peremptory command mandating that
“all” federal criminal trials “shall be by jury.”455 In focusing
on these developments, the immediate goal of this Article has
been to put us in Justice Sutherland’s seat, to help us feel the
pressures on him as he and his colleagues considered whether
the traditional no-waiver rule was constitutionally required.
In addition, this Article has demonstrated the impact of
motivated reasoning on historical scholarship and on the use
lawyers and judges make of it.456 Motivated reasoning helps
set the historians’ research agenda, influences the discovery
and interpretation of evidence, and strongly affects the
reception and use of historical scholarship by lawyers, judges,
and the public.457
These findings raise grave concerns about the viability of
originalist jurisprudence as it is practiced by the bench and
bar. 458 Originalist jurisprudence is supposed to constrain
judges, to make constitutional law a matter of empirical
discovery rather than discretionary judgments that permit
judges to read their own values into the Constitution.459 Yet,
if judges constantly, even if unconsciously, read their
predilections into the historical record, originalist practice
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undermines the very reason originalist theory posits for its
existence.460
Moreover, if judges are reading their predilections into
the Constitution, whether meretriciously or because of
motivated reasoning, we have an evolving Constitution that
changes as the judges and their values change. To the extent
this evolution occurs under an originalist jurisprudence by
which judges claim to discover how the Founding generation
understood the Constitution’s text, our contemporary
constitutionalism is in a situation that is similar to the
predicament of private law jurisprudence at the end of the
nineteenth century.
At that time, private law was dominated by a formalist
jurisprudence that depicted new decisions as logical
elaborations of past precedent.461 At the same time, jurists
recognized that the common law was constantly evolving in
tune with changing social norms and societal needs.462 To
reconcile the conflict between their ideal beliefs and positive
observations, nineteenth-century jurists developed a variety
of related legal philosophies, collectively known as historical
jurisprudence,463 that recognized legal change but depicted it
as an instinctive and unconscious infusion of new principles
adopted from the customary practices and developing norms
of the people.464
In other words, late-nineteenth century common law
theorists acknowledged the inevitable evolutionary character
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 88 Side A
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460. See Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 169, 170–73 (2009) (discussing originalism’s inability to constrain judicial
decisions).
461. Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the
Transformation of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 446–48 (1982);
Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop’s Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 215, 221–24
(1995).
462. See Stephen A. Siegel, Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy: God, Historical
Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal Thought, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 422, 426–
29, 432–36 (2004); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth Century
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1459–64, 1492–97, 1521–22.
463. David Rabban, The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth Century American
Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 541 (2003); David Rabban, The
Historiography of The Common Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1161 (2003);
Siegel, Wharton’s Orthodoxy, supra note 462, at 432–35.
464. See, e.g., Siegel, Historism, supra note 462, at 1459–64, 1492–97, 1521–
22.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 88 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC

454

3/14/2012 2:57:38 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

of private law.465 They recognized that private law changed
along with social and economic development. Since most law
was judge made, they recognized that over time judges
changed the law with their rulings. Nonetheless, to cabin
their admission, late-nineteenth century historical jurists
insisted that common law evolution was slow, instinctive, and
unconscious. Although common law evolution was observable
in retrospect, they insisted that each generation could not see
that it was departing from its past.466
Modern law sprang into being when Progressive jurists
such as Holmes and Roscoe Pound asked: if law is an evolving
product of the human mind, why not make it conscious and
subject it to rational debate, rather than to the happenstance
of unconscious and haphazard decisionmaking? This is the
burden of Holmes’s epoch-making essay, The Path of the
Law,467 and Roscoe Pound’s seminal articles on Sociological
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465. The remarks in this paragraph are drawn from the material cited in
supra notes 461–63.
466. As Francis Wharton, one of the most prominent of these jurists wrote:
[T]he common law as a whole, while it moves, moves so slowly and
unobservedly, that though it occupies in each generation a position
different from what it occupied in a prior generation, at no particular
time can it be spoken of as in motion. It is in this respect like a glacier
which is congealed and yet flows . . . . While the law moves thus
unobservedly—while new rules come into existence no knows how, and
no one knows when—it moves in complex sympathy with the
conscience and genius of the people from whom it emanates . . . . So
arises the common law, which, from its very nature fluctuates
instinctively with the people whose sense of right it expresses, and
whose needs it meets. And no code that is not in like manner
declaratory of the popular sense of right and need can stand.
FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW 99–100 (1884); see also Siegel,
Wharton’s Orthodoxy, supra note 462, at 434–38 (analyzing Wharton’s remark).
467. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997). In this essay, Holmes
famously says:
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history.
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know
the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part
of the rational study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened
scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of
those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain
and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just
what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next
is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal . . . .
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
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Jurisprudence.468
For over one-hundred years we have lived with the
recognition that the infusion of contemporary values into
private law is inevitable and, if only for that reason,
desirable. In light of that insight, we have developed private
law jurisprudences that valorize legal change when it is the
product of conscious and articulated reasons. Now that we
know that evolution in public law is similarly inevitable, we
must develop public law jurisprudences that embrace and
grow from, rather than deny, the observation that the
infusion of contemporary values into constitutional law is
inevitable. Since we have a living constitution, it is better
that the principles guiding its evolution be subject to open
debate rather than adopted unconsciously or pretextually
through decisions that falsely claim to be logical elaborations
of principles adopted by the Constitution-makers of 1789.
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grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, 1897, supra, at 468.
468. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence
(pts. 1–3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (1911–1912).

